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Losses in respect of loans occur in various circumstances. These include a deliberate 
action by the creditor to reduce or discharge a debt (sometimes referred to as "debt 
forgiveness or waiver"), a loss on a loan because of the liquidation of a debtor, the sale of 
a loan for an amount less than its face value, the prescription of debts and the conversion 
of a loan to shares of which the market value is less than the face value of the loan. 
Depending on the nature of the loan such losses could have various income tax or capital 
gains tax implications for both the debtor and creditor, such as taxable recoupments, 
reduction of assessed losses or capital gains or losses. The tax effects may differ when the 
parties are connected or are part of the same group of companies. 
Essentially, there are three core provisions in the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (ITA) 
which are applicable namely, section 8(4) (m), S20 (l)(a)(ii), and paragraph 12(5) of the 
Eighth Schedule. Identifying the facts resulting to a loss on a loan is not the tricky part 
but rather application of the correct section to those particular facts. The matter is 
sometimes further complicated by the terminology used and words in the ITA that have 
not yet been interpreted or defined in the Act. 
There is often uncertainty where debt waivers are concerned, however court decisions in 
case law can assist with the interpretation of certain aspects contained in the 
aforementioned sections. 
This research will introduce the concept of debt forgiveness and highlight vanous 
definitions and legal concepts such as prescription, compromise, and other forms of debt 
relinquishments. Part of the introduction will briefly discuss the treatment of debt relief in 












Chapter 1 will also discuss the two cases dealing with the application of paragraph 12(5) 
of the Eighth Schedule of the ITA namely ITC 1793 and the case number 12399 (the 
unreported decision of the Kimberley Tax Court taken in January 2009 
Chapter 2 will deal briefly with the main income tax sections applicable namely, s 8(4) 
(m), s20, and paragraph 12(5) of the Eighth Schedule taking into account other authors 
views on the issues at hand. As losses on loans further result to capital gains tax 
consequences, it is important to briefly discuss the four building blocks of the Eighth 
Schedule which deals with capital gains and losses namely asset, proceeds, disposal and 
base cost. 
Additional sections such as paragraph 39 and 56 of the Eighth Schedule will also be dealt 
with focusing on issues concerning connected persons. It is necessary to also examine the 
law dealing with donations and dividends as there are circumstances where these may 
give rise to debt forgiveness. 
A case study will be presented in chapter 3, which will assist in the identification and 
subsequent application of the relevant sections of the ITA. In chapter 4 The applicable 
case law and various definitions will be discussed as they relate to the various scenarios 
presented in the case study. 
The last Chapter will compare the South African tax system with that of some of other 
countries and will converse the differences and similarities relating to the treatment of the 
debt waivers. 
I will make use of relevant Income Tax provISIOns, case law, articles, journals and 
various tax law textbooks in trying to address various issues that arise from each case 
study. 
The focus of the paper is to introduce (and maybe add to) the existing problems discussed 
by various authors and highlight issues that are faced by taxpayers when dealing with 











the case study and then to reach a justifiable and logical conclusion. The complexity 
surrounding the application of these provisions will also be illustrated. 
1.2. Definitions and concepts 
1.2.1 Compromise 
A compromise (settlement, transactio), is the settlement by agreement of disputed 
obligations, whether contractual or otherwise. I The agreement is characterized by 
uncertainty as to the existence or terms of a legal relationship and parties agree to 
regulate their relations by creating a new set of obligations between them.2 A 
compromise has the ability to terminate uncertainties and is utilized by parties to avoid 
the inconvenience, costs and risk inherent in resorting to other methods of resolving 
disputes.3 
Even though the contract may be described by the parties, the court will look at substance 
rather than form in determining whether a particular obligation or dispute has been 
compromised.4 Distinct from a novation, a compromise is binding even though the 
original contract was invalid or illegal. 5 
A party alleging that a compromise has been reached bears the onus to prove its 
existence. This is because a compromise is a form of a novation and involves the 
waiver of existing rights (or claimed rights). It must be as clearly and unambiguously 
proved as any other waiver or novation.6 Further, a compromise is a type of a contract 
and parties must have the capacity to contract with each other and comply with all the 
requirements of a valid contract. Furthermore, a compromise may be set aside on the 
I RH Christie. 2006. The Law o/Contract in South A/rica: 5th Edition. Lexisnexis Elecronic version Page 
446 
2 Van Der Merwe, Van Huyssteen, Reinecke, Lubbe. 2007. Contract General Principles:, Third Edition, 
Landsdowne: Juta law, Page 538 
3 Supra 538 
./ RH Christie. 2006. The Law o/Contract in South Africa: 5th Edition. Lexisnexis Elecronic version,Page 
446 













grounds of fraud or iustus error. 7 The latter statement finds support in the relevant case 
of Wessels v Badenhorst where Barry AlP said; 
"In a proper case a compromise (like any other contract) can be set aside either on the 
ground of fraud or iustus error. In the case of the latter ground the mistake must be with 
regard to facts which affect the validity of the transaction and not, as Bristowe J points 
out in Natal Bank v Kuranda 1907 TH 155 167, ignorance of a point which it is intended 
. ,,8 
to compromise. 
Certain parties such as lawyers and advocates may have the power to compromise on 
behalf of their clients in accordance with what was said by Hutton 1 in Alexander v 
Klitzke 1918 EDL 8788: 
"The authority of a power of attorney which is filed by the client, to carry his case to a 
final end and determination does include authority to make a bona fide compromise in 
the interests of his client, and at any rate, if the client wishes to repudiate such a 
compromise made on his behalf, then I certainly think that the repudiation should be a 
timeous one. Y 
An advocate may be briefed to conduct such a case and Rule 41(4) of the Uniform Rules 
does not require a written settlement of a suit to be signed by parties iO . A mere 
instruction to claim an amount is not sufficiently wide to include power to compromise 
as this will depend on the nature of the instruction but the dictum quoted above will also 
find application in the case of an advocate. II 
Executors and administrators have the power to compromise in the interests of the estate 
and where the compromise includes anything for which the leave of the court is required, 
that leave must be obtained. 12 The shares of co-debtors and co-creditors in a compromise 
are determined according to the ordinary rules applicable to such parties. 13Lastly, any 
7 Supra 
N Wessels v Badenhorst 1939 TPD 465 459 
Y Supra 
10 Siebert & Honey v Van Tonder 1981 SA 146 (0) 














legal relationship that existed pnor to a compromIse IS extinguished. 14 Further, a 
compromise brings any legal proceeding that is already instituted to an end and bars 
further legal proceedings in respect of the original or disputed cause of action. IS 
1.2.2 Prescription 
Prescription, generally described, is when repayment of a debt can no longer be enforced. 
The Prescription Act 68 of 1969 came into operation on 1 December 1970, repealing Act 
18 of 1943 which still finds application to any debts which arose before 1 December 
1970. 16 
The Prescription Act is not a complete codification of the law of extensive prescription, 
so common law rules that are not inconsistent with the provision of the Act remain in 
force. 17 Wessels in para 2748-2848 deals with common law and the 1943 Act below; 18 
"The Act covers acquisitive prescription, with which we are not here concerned, and the 
extinctive prescription of debts of all types. We are here concerned only with the 
extinctive prescription of contractual debts. The Act refers exclusively to debts, which at 
once raises the question of what types of claim in the field of contract are covered. It 
might be thought that the word "debt" should bear its primary meaning of an obligation 
to pay [Page 483] money, but clearly this is not so. It is permissible to refer to the 
memorandum of Professor De Wet, the draftsman of the Act, paras 71-75 of which 
indicate that the word" debt" was chosen, not with the intention of restricting the scope 
of prescription, but in order to change from a "weak" prescription system of barring the 
remedy to a "strong" prescription system of extinguishing the right. 
There can be no quarrel with King J's words in Evins v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 
19793 SA 1136 (W) 1141F: 
"The word 'debt' in the Prescription Act must be given a wide and general meaning 
denoting not only a debt sounding in money which is due, but also, for example, a debt 
for the vindication of property. " 
There is no formula that ,;an be used to determine a wide and general meaning of the 
word debt but it is suffice to say that a debt is to be construed as the correlative of a 
U Van Der Merwe, Van Huyssteen, Reinecke, Lubbe. 2007. Contract General Principles:, Third Edition, 
Landsdowne: Juta law,Page 540 
15 Supra 














right of action, the debt and the right of action being the opposite side of an obligation 
which generally embraces a proprietary element and duty. 19 
One may argue that the contractual remedy to rescind is not affected by the Act due to 
the fact that the word "debt" has not been stretched that far. 2oOn the other hand, one may 
also argue in defense that there is a right of action to rescind based on a breach of an 
obligation not to induce a contract by misrepresentation, and the correlative of that right 
of action or the other pole of the obligation is therefore a debt. 21 A different view would 
mean that one has to go back to the common law periods of prescription for rescission 
since the 1943 Act is repealed and this would be contrary to Professor De Wet's (the 
draftsman of the Act) memorandum?2 
It would be necessary to go back to the classification of actions by their Latin names, 
which Professor De Wet criticized in para 75, and if the action could be classified as an 
action redhibitorio it would prescribe in six months, but a court can use its discretion to 
extend this period.23 If an action is classified as an action for restitution in intergrum it 
would prescribe in four years and action for restitution in integrum on the ground of 
dolus or metus would prescribe in thirty years.24 
Previously, there was a distinction between the complete extinction of a right by 
prescription and the barring of a remedy by prescription, leaving a natural obligation. 
Section 10 of the 1969 Prescription Act makes it clear that a debt has to be extinguished 
completely leaving no natural obligation in cases where the period specified in section 11 
or any other law as applicable to a particular debt has expired.25 However, section 10(3) 
provides that payment of a prescribed debt shall be regarded as a payment of a debt 
19 Supra 




23 Supra 484 
].I Supra 











meaning the conditio will not be liable to the return of such a payment. 26 Van Heerden J 
makes some comments concerning this anomaly in Lipschitz v Dechamps Textiles GmbH 
and says; 
"Section 10(3) as pointed out by Mr. Berman does seem to contain an anomaly by 
regarding payment of a debt after it has been extinguished by prescription as payment of 
the debt. As far as anomalies are concerned however I find myself in respectful 
agreement with what Milne JP said on good authority in Manjra v Desai and Another 
1968 (2) SA 249 (N) at 254: 
'Where the words of a statute are plain, mere anomalies would not justifY a departure 
from their literal meaning unless they are such as to demonstrate that their literal 
meaning is not the meaning which the Legislature intended them to have. ' 
This anomaly cause's confusion because section 10(1) clearly states that once the period 
provided has lapsed, the debt is extinguished, while section 10(2) further states that once 
the debt is extinguished it can not be recharged. Maybe section 10(3) was inserted to 
remove any doubt occasioned by differences of opinion which existed amongst Roman-
Dutch authorities, and to settle the law as to whether a debtor who has paid a prescribed 
debt may reclaim his money or not. 27 
Section 11 of the Prescription Act provides us with the periods of prescription as follows; 
"The periods of prescription of debts shall be the following: 
(a) 
26 Supra 
Thirty years in respect of -
(i) any debt secu ed by a mortgage bond; 
(ii) any judgment debt; 
(iii) any debt in respect of any taxation imposed or levied by or under any law; 
(iv) any debt owed to the State in respect of any share of the profits, royalties or 
any similar consideration payable in respect of the right to mine minerals 
or other substances; 
(b) Fifteen years in respect of any debt owed to the State and arising out of an 
advance or loan of money or sale or lease of land by the State to the debtor, 
unless a longer period applies in respect of the debt in question in terms of 
paragraph (a); 












(c) six years in respect of a debt arising from a bill of exchange or other negotiable 
instrument or from a notarial contract, unless a longer period applies in respect 
of the debt in question in terms of paragraph (a) or (b); 
(d) save where an Act of Parliament provides otherwise, three years in respect of any 
other debt. " 
It is to be noted that there is no distinction between written, oral or tacit contracts, and 
that contractual debts are subject to the three year period?8 Section 12(1) further states 
that prescription is to run as soon as the debt is due. 
"this means that there has to be a debt immediately claimable by the debtor [sc 
creditor] or, as stated in another way, that there has to be a debt in respect of which 
the debtor is under an obligation to perform immediately. ,,29 
In List v Jungers 1979 3 SA 106 (A) 121 C Diemont JA observed that: 
"Counsel pointed out that the date on which a debt arises usually coincides with the 
date on which it becomes due, but that is not always the case. The difference relates 
to the coming into existence of the debt on the one hand and the recoverability 
thereof on the other hand. " 
A debt to perform a contractual duty by its nature becomes due in accordance with the 
contract and the interpretation of the contract will in the absence of relevant indicators 
show when prescription starts to run?OIn the relevant case of De Jager v ABSA Bank Bpk 
2000 4 All SA 481 (A) the court said that the Act is designed to promote certainty in the 
affairs of people and is aimed at fairness towards a debtor. It follows that an undertaking 
not to raise the defense of prescription is enforceable and not contrary to public policy. 
28 Supra Pg 485 
29 Deloitte Haskins & Sells Consultants (Pty) Ltdv Bowthorpe Hellerman Deutch (Pty) Ltd 19911 SA 525 
(A) 532,H per Van Heerden JA 













A waiver or release occurs when a debtor and creditor conclude an agreement, which 
frees the debtor from the obligation between them.31 This agreement has an effect of 
extinguishing all the obligations arising from the contract. The release in this sense is a 
debt distinguishing agreement and does not constitute a contract. 
Even though the release is not a contract it still has to be concluded expressly or tacitly 
and must comply with the general requirements of a valid contract. 320ne must not focus 
on the question of contractual capacity and whether or not there is a need to conform to 
public policy but carefully look at the intention of the parties as it is the decisive 
element. 33 One way of establishing intention to release or waive is to ascertain that the 
parties or at least the party alleged to have divested himself of the right had full 
knowledge of it. 34 
RH Christie makes an interesting observation regarding the habit of using the word 
'waiver' and its synonyms and I feel it is necessary to quote him in full. 
But, as will be seen, the water has been muddied by our habit of using the word 
"waiver" and its synonyms in the context of a right conferred by law, such as the 
right to rescind for misrepresentation. This habit has muddied the water because 
waiver of a right conferred by the terms of a contract should logically be regarded 
as a donation which, like any other donation, requires acceptance to be effective, 
whereas waiver of a right conferred by law does not require acceptance, and the 
courts have not always drawn this distinction. As a result the proposition that waiver 
is always unilateral and does not require acceptance has some support. The 
proposition should be resisted, not for the sterile reason of maintaining doctrinal 
purity, but for the practical reason of doing justice in those rare cases where a party 
has good reason for not accepting the unilateral variation or discharge of his 
contract by waiver. 
In Roman law discharge of a contract by agreement had to be by the same method by 
which the contract was made. As a result the method of discharge by agreement 
which was recognized as the most trustworthy - acceptilatio, which was a form of 
stipulatio in reverse - could be employed only if the contract was in the form of a 
31 Van Der Merwe, Van Huyssteen, Reinecke, Lubbe. 2007. Contract General Principles:, Third Edition, 
Landsdowne: Juta law , Page 526 













stipulatio. It was therefore common practice to novate other forms of contract into a 
stipulatio in order to discharge them by acceptilatio. 
The practical Dutch would have none of this and, just as they freed the making of 
contracts from the Roman formalities, so they freed their unmaking. Grotius 3 41 7, 
as usual, is like a breath offresh air: 
"In Roman law release by way of gift required a certainform of words: but with us, 
as in contracting so in discharging an obligation, it is enough that such words 
should be used as import an abandonment by the releaser of his right, and that this 
should be accepted by the debtor or in his name. " 
In the concluding words of that passage Grotius makes an important point which is 
often overlooked or obscured by our modern terminology. When the parties to an 
existing contract come together in an agreeing frame of mind and formally or 
informally agree to vary or discharge their contract we have no difficulty about 
describing what has happened as a variation or discharge by agreement, or a 
cancellation by agreement But when one of the parties, by his words, actions or 
inaction, has evinced an intention not to enforce one or more or all of his rights 
conferred by the contract we select whichever word seems most appropriate from a 
list which includes abandonment, acquiescence, release, renunciation surrender, 
election, relinquishing of a right and waiver. Of these words by far the most 
commonly used is waiver, which is regarded in many of the cases as interchangeable 
with any of the other words. There is no harm in using whichever word seems best 
descriptive of what has happened, provided it is remembered that the rules of 
English law which attach to some of these words are not necessarily part of our law 
and provided the point so clearly made by Grotius 341 is also remembered - that 
gratuitous waiver (or whatever one prefers to call it) of a right conferred by the 
terms of a contract is a donation35. 
I fully agree with the latter quote, it is understandable that, when a creditor releases the 
debtor of an obligation to pay and the debtor does not accept or reject the release, that 
may create an impression that the debtor approves the release. However, in a case where 
the debtor specifically rejects an offer to be released from an obligation for a relevant 
reason, it would be unfair to force such waiver on the debtor. In this instance, the waiver 
cannot be regarded as a donation because it was not accepted. 
While RH Christie at 36437 was addressing the nature of a Waiver he submitted the 
following quote; 
" Waiver of a right conferred by the terms of a contract should logically be regarded 
as a donation which like any other donation, requires acceptance to be effective ... " 
35 RH Christie, Law of Contract in South Africa, 5th Edition (2006) Pg 347 











The above view is supported by the decision in the Sussens37 case where the 
requisites of a waiver were held to be as follows: 
"waiver follows from the principle that waiver is a form of a contract in which one 
party is taken deliberately to have surrendered his rights: there must therefore be 
proof of an intention so to surrender, which can only exist where there is knowledge 
both of the facts and the legal consequences thereof" 
In the Pretorius v Greylinl8 case Price J also said; 
"Before there is a waiver there must be an unequivocal act done with full 
knowledge of all the relevant facts as well as of the rights which it is argued 
have been waived. This Knowledge, to be effective in the case of waiver, 
must be the knowledge of a single person, not partly of one and partly of 
another, because no intention to waive can be inferred unless the particular 
person himself who commits the act which is said to constitute waiver knew 
of the relevant facts and intended to waive the rights of which he was fully 
aware". 
A donation is a contract, not a unilateral effective act, so unless an offer to donate is 
accepted there can be no donation.39 In the relevant case of Free State mining and 
Finance Corp Ltd v Union Free State Gold Diamond Corpn Ltd 40Munnik AJ said; 
"I do not think that a creditor can by the mere exercise of his will terminate the 
obligation without the concurrence of the debtor because as both Wessels {para 
2344A} and Pothier {s 578] point out a release, waiver or abandonment is 
tantamount to maki g a donation to the debtor of the obligation from which he is to 
be released and until that donation has been accepted it has not been perfected. 
There may conceivably be circumstances in which a debtor does not wish to be 
released from his obligation. It may for a variety of reasons not suit him to be 
released. To allow the release, waiver or abandonment and the consequent making 
of a donation dependent solely on the will or action of the creditor would be 
37 Ex parte Suss ens 1941 TPD 15 
38 Pretorious v Greyling 1947 I 171 (W) 177 
39 Van Der Merwe, Van Huyssteen, Reinecke, Lubbe. 2007. Contract General Principles:, Third Edition, 
Landsdowne: Juta law , Page438 











tantamount to creating a contract at the will of one party which is a concept foreign 
to our jurisprudence. " 
With reference to the above case a party relying on waiver has to prove that the waiver 
was accepted by the other party. In addition, the waiver has to be communicated (to the 
creditor) until then the party who has decided to waive may change hislher mind. There's 
a presumption in some cases against the waiver and the party asserting the waiver has to 
on balance of probabilities prove the existence of a waiver.41 There are various cases 
proving that the onus is not easily discharged. In Hepner v Roodepoort-Maraisburg 
Town counci!42Steyn CJ said; 
"There is authority for the view that in the case of waiver by conduct, the conduct 
must leave no reasonable doubt as to the intention of surrendering the right in issue 
(Smith v Momberg (1895) 12 SC 295 at p 304; Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power 
Co Ltd v Consolidated Langlaagte Mines Ltd 1915 AD 1 at p 62) but in Martin v de 
Kock 1948 (2) SA 719 (AD) at p 733 this Court indicated that that view may possibly 
require reconsideration. It sets, I think, a higher standard than that adopted in Laws 
v Rutherfurd 1924 AD 261 at p 263, where Innes CJ says: 
The onus is strictly on the appellant. He must show that th  respondent, with full 
knowledge of her right, decided to abandon it, whether expressly or by conduct 
plainly inconsistent with an intention to enforce it. ' 
This accords with the test applied in City of Cape Town v Kenny 1934 AD 543 and 
was followed in Collen v Rietfontein Engineering Works 1948 (1) SA 413 (AD) at p 
436 and Linton v Corser 1952 (3) SA 685 (AD) at p 695. (Cf Ellis and others v 
Laubscher 1956 (4) SA 692 (AD) at p 702). In my opinion the test is more correctly 
stated in these cases. " 
In a related case of Road Accident fund v Mothup143 the court reviewed the requirements 
of an inferred waiver. The court held that the test must be objective, that the intention to 
waive must be adjudged by its outward manifestations and reservations that are not 
communicated are of no legal consequences. In addition, the intention must be 
considered from a reasonable person point of view in the position of the other party. 
Further, the court may look at what the parties believed and intended at the time but these 
two elements are not conclusive. Essentially, when one is dealing with a contract or a 
legal document that specifically states the detailed circumstances where a person is 
41 Van Der Merwe, Van Huyssteen, Reinecke, Lubbe. 2007. Contract General Principles:, Third Edition, 
Landsdowne: Juta law, Page441 
n 19624 SA 772 (A) 











deemed to have waived, this will be conclusive and no further inquiry is required in this 
regard.44 
1.2.4 Liquidation / Sequestration 
An application for sequestration may only be brought in relation to an estate of a debtor 
as defined in section 1 of the Insolvency ACt.45 In the relevant case of Estate Logie v 
Priest 46 Solomon JA said that "it is perfectly legitimate for a creditor to take insolvency 
proceedings against a debtor for the purpose of obtaining payment of his debt." 
Therefore, if a creditor has a case (and its liquidated claim is not less than R 100 000) it 
may initiate these proceedings provided that his proceedings do not constitute an abuse 
of the process of the court.47 
1.2.4.1 Grounds for creditor's application 
A creditor may only apply for sequestration of his debtor's estate in two instances, 
namely, when a debtor has committed an act of insolvency (described below) as defined 
in section 8 of the Insolvency Act and if the debtor is insolvent (when his liabilities 
exceed the value of his assets).48 In addition to the existence of the two instances, the 
creditor must be able to prove that there is a reason to believe that it will be to the 
advantage of creditors of the debtor ifhis estate is sequestrated49. 
44 RH Christie. 2006. The Law of Contract in South Africa: 5th Edition. Lexisnexis Electronic version Page 
442 
45 Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 
46 1926AF312 at 319 
47 PM Meskin; B Galgut; PAM Magid;JA Kunst; A Boraine; DA Burdette. Insolvency Law. Last updated 













1.2.4.1.1 Acts of insolvency 
Section 8 of the Insolvency Act provides us with a list of acts performed by a debtor 
which will constitute acts of insolvency. 50 These acts are as follows; 
In terms of section 8(a) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, a debtor commits an act of 
insolvency where he does any of the following: (i) he leaves the Republic or (ii) being 
outside the Republic, he remains absent therefrom or (iii) he departs from his dwelling or 
(iv) he otherwise absents himself, provided, in each case, he does so "with intent to evade 
or delay the payment of his debts". 
In terms of Section 8( b) of the Insolvency Act: 
"A debtor commits an act of insolvency - if a court has given judgment 
against him and he fails, upon the demand of the officer whose duty it is to 
execute that judgment, to satisfy it or to indicate to that officer disposable 
property sufficient to satisfy it, or if it appears from the return made by that 
officer that he has not found sufficient disposable property to satisfy the 
judgment. " 
(c) "A debtor commits an act of insolvency - if he makes or attempts to make 
any disposition of any of his property which has or would have the effect of 
prejudicing his creditors or of preferring one creditor above another ". 
(d) "if he removes or att mpts to remove any of his property with intent to 
prejudice his creditors or to prefer one creditor above another ". 
(e) "if he makes or offers to make any arrangement with any of his creditors 
for releasing him wholly or partially from his debts ". 
(f) "where, after publishing a notice of surrender of his estate, which has 
neither lapsed nor been withdrawn,l he fails to lodge the requisite statement 
of his affairs or he lodges such a statement which is incorrect or incomplete 
in any material respect or he fails to apply for the acceptance of the 












(g) "if he gives notice in writing to anyone of his creditors that he is unable 
to pay any of his debts" 
(h) "if, being a trader, he gives notice in the Gazette in terms of sub-section 
(1) of section thirty-four, and is thereafter unable to pay all his debts". 
Submission of sufficient proof of any such act that is distinct from proof of 
actual insolvency is sufficient for the purposes of obtaining a sequestration 
order. 51 The Legislature inserted these provisions to cater for the fact that in 
practice, a creditor might not have adequate evidence to prove that his 
debtor is insolvent. 52 
An agent of a debtor commits an act of insolvency if the principal was aware of his 
agent's actions and gave consent, authorized accordingly, expressly or 
impliedly53.Further, an act of insolvency in the name of a partnership that was committed 
by a partner within the scope of his authority as such is an act of insolvency by the 
partnership for the purpose of obtaining an order for the sequestration of its' estate. 54 
1.2.4.1.2 Actual insolvency 
Actual insolvency is when the debtor's liabilities actually exceed the value of his assets.55 
A substantial amount of authority has pointed out that there must be clear proof of actual 
insolvency. 56 However in terms of general principle, it suffices to prove that actual 
insolvency exists on a balance of probabilities. 57 
51 Supra 45 
52 Supra 
53 Supra 
54 C f Anderson & Co v Hutton & Co (1875) Buch 73 at 74-75; and see, eg, Stephen Fraser 
(Pty) Ltd v Ramla and Others 1961 (2) SA 554 (W). 
55 PM Meskin; B Galgut; PAM Magid;JA Kunst; A Boraine; DA Burdette. Insolvency Law.Last updated 













In cases where the creditor relies on both grounds for the sequestration of a debtor's 
estate and the alleged grounds of actual insolvency are disputed, proof of alleged acts of 
insolvency will suffice58. One may try to establish actual insolvency directly by 
producing evidence of the debtor's liabilities and of the market value of his assets at the 
date of the application. 59 Alternatively, one may try to institute actual insolvency 
indirectly by providing evidence of circumstances that indicate thereof i.e. the fact that 
the debts remain unpaid, or the debtor has reached a compromise with creditors6o. Courts 
are careful in inferring insolvency to such circumstances but it suffices if such an 
inference can be drawn, notwithstanding that the precise amount of the deficiency is 
uncertain. 61 
1.2.4.2 Liquidation of a company 
Item 9 of Schedule 5 of the new Companies Act62 provides for continued application of 
provisions in the old Act that deal with the winding-up and liquidation of a company 
despite the repeal of the previous Act. Exclusively, Chapter 14 of the Companies Act 61 
of 1973 continues to apply with respect to the winding-up and liquidation of companies 
under the new Act as ifthat Act had not been repealed subject to sub items (2) and (3).63 
Specifically, section 349 of the old Act provides that a company may be wound up 
voluntarily if the company has by special resolution resolved that it be wound Up64. The 
special resolution may provide for a members voluntary winding up or a creditors' 
voluntary winding up by means of sections 350 and 351 65 . Section 351 states that 
voluntary winding up of a company shall be a creditors' voluntary winding up if the 
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While for members voluntary winding-up, section 350 provides that the special 
resolution will not be in force and effective unless it is registered in terms of section 200 
and prior to registration, security has been furnished prior to the satisfaction of the 
Master for the payment of the debts of the company within twelve months from the 
commencement of the winding up process. 67 
The Master may dispense with the furnishing of security requirement if the directors of 
the company provided him with a sworn statement68 or a certificate by the auditor of the 
company that to the best of his knowledge and belief and according to the record of the 
company, it has no debts69. 
A company may be wound up by court ifit is unable to pay its debts7o.A company is 
deemed to be unable to pay its debts if a creditor to whom the company is indebted in a 
sum not less than one hundred rand due and payable, served on the company by leaving 
the same at its registered office, a demand requiring the company to pay the sum due7 ! 
and the company failed to do so within three weeks. Further, a judgment or decree or an 
order of any court issued in favor of the creditor of the company has been returned by a 
messenger or sheriff with an endorsement that he has not found sufficient property to 
satisfy the judgment, decree or order72 . 
1.2.4.2 Conclusion 
Where a loan or debt is not repayable it is critical to establish the reason for this as 
discussed in the definitions in this part. Once it is established it can then be determined 
which sections of the Income Tax Act may be applicable to the situation. These are 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
67 Supra 
68 Section 350 (a)(ii)(aa) 
69 Section 350 (a)(ii)(bb) 
70 Section 344 (f) 
71 Section 345 (J)(a)(i) 











1.3 Losses on loans from an International tax perspective 
Certain similar legislation of various countries regarding waivers is briefly highlighted in 
this part to illustrate that this area is not unique to South Africa. 
1.3.1 Belgium 
(Partial) Waiver of debt in the hands of the debtor creates a decrease of liabilities and 
correlatively, a taxable profit.73 If the taxpayer has carried forward tax losses, it may use 
it to offset this taxable profit arising from the waiver provided that such a waiver cannot 
be considered as the granting of an abnormal or benevolent advantage. 74 
In the hands of the creditor, a (partial) waiver leads to a decrease of assets, which is in 
principle tax deductible if the following conditions are met75 ; the waiver 
(i) does not constitute an abnormal or benevolent advantage, 
(ii) it is not the counterpart of an increase of the creditor's assets and, 
(iii) It meets the requirement for being considered as a professional expense. 
The Belgium tax administration is reluctant to sign-off on a waiver of debt between 
related parties and the tax deductibility of such a waiver is often denied in the hands of 
the creditor and, moreover, if this at the time qualified as a abnormal or benevolent 
advantage received in the hands ofthe debtor, it can lead to double economic taxation. 76 
On the other hand, there are certain factual or judicial elements, that are more easily 
accepted by case-law than by tax administration, and can favor the creditor such as 
participating in a judicial recovery plan, saving the creditor's reputation, or having strong 
business relations with the debtor. Furthermore, a waiver of debt can be concluded with a 
"return to better fortune" clause, which means that the debtor is not released from its 














obligation but that performance of this obligation is subject to the debtor escaping from 
its difficult financial status.77 This clause is a compulsory requirement for the Belgium 
Ruling Commission considering the waiver to be at arms length.78 On the other hand, if 
the debtor returns to better fortune, the repayment of the debt will lead to recapturing the 
previous write-downs. 79 
1.3.2 Denmark 
Section 3 of the Taxation of Gains and losses on Claims Act ("The Act: )80 provides that 
debts and financial instruments, capital gains and losses arising from the sale or 
repayment of claims and debts, such as bonds, debentures and other debt instruments, 
from the relinquishment of debt and from the sale of financial contracts including call 
and put options without any regard to the tax treatment of the underlying assets are, in 
the case of a company, generally subject to ordinary taxation. 81 
Furthermore, this provision will find application irrespective of whether the companies in 
question are domestic or foreign or whether they are jointly taxed. 82 
A release is taxable if the debt is reduced to an amount lower than the value of the debt at 
the time of the relinquishment. 83 If the parent company of a Danish subsidiary is a 
foreign company and is able to prove that the loss is not deductible under its domestic 
legislation, then the release also will not be taxable in the foreign state.84In that case the 
loss will also not be carried forward. 
There is to some degree, similarities between the Denmark taxation laws and South 
African ("SA") tax law when dealing with the relinquishment of debt that is outstanding. 
77 Ariane Brohez and Noe Denis. November 2008. Taxation o/Corporate Restructuring in Belgium. IIJ.A 
78 Supra 
79 Supra 
80 Taxation o/Gains and losses on Claims Act no. 832 o/October 2, 2002 
8JTaxation o/Gains and losses on Claims Act no. 832 o/October 2,2002, Section 3 













The SA Law of Contract is familiar with the concept of debt waivers (discussed in 
paragraph 1.2.3). In terms of the law of contract, a waiver occurs when a debtor and 
creditor conclude an agreement where the debtor is released from its obligation to pay a 
debt outstanding. 
The SA Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 deals with instances where a debtor is released from 
its obligation to pay in section 8(4) (m) and paragraph 12(5) of the Eighth Schedule. 
These provisions will be dealt with extensively in Chapter 2. 
1.3.2.1 Compositions 
Section 24 of the Taxation of Gains and Losses on claims Act provides that debt released 
under a general composition with a debtor and creditor is not taxable, subject to certain 
conditions.85 This occurs if the composition is made with a majority of the creditors or 
with one major creditor provided that the claims of the creditors are reduced in 
accordance with the ranking set fourth in the Act on Bankruptcy.86 The composition will 
usually qualify if more than 50% of the debt of the debtor is relinquished and also when 
there is a composition with the majority creditors where minor creditors are paid in full. 87 
1.3.2.2 Loss Carry Forward 
Taxable losses that occurred from the income year 2002 may be carried forward 
indefinitely.88 However, if the loss was incurred before 2002, it may only be carried 
forward for five years. If a taxpayer concluded a general composition with its creditors, 
the taxable losses incurred are reduced by the amount of debt relinquished consisting of 
the difference between the nominal value of the debt and the actual value of the debt 
released. 89 
85 Taxation of Gains and losses on Claims Act no. 832 of October 2, 2002, Section 24 
86 Supra 
117 Supra 
88 Tax Assessment Act no. 791 of 17 September, 2002 











Section 20(1) (a) (ii) of the SA Income Tax Act applies where the debtor enters into a 
compromise or a concession with its creditors. The benefit received by the debtor as a 
result of such compromise or concession reduces the balance of the debtors assessed 
losses. 
Section 24 of the Taxation of Gains and Losses on claims Act in Demark is similar to the 
latter section but specifically makes provision for a composition made with majority 
shareholders. If the composition is made with the majority creditors, the debt released by 
the creditors will not be taxable. In SA it remains unclear whether or not it matters that 
the minority or majority of the creditors enter into a compromise or a concession with the 
debtor (see discussion in chapter 2 paragraph 2.2.2) 
A special provision applies if the creditor is not taxable in Denmark but is a member of 
the same group of companies as the debtor. The amount by which the taxable losses of 
the debtor is limited is reduced only by the amount released by the group company if the 
debtor is able to demonstrate that the loss may not be deducted for corporate income tax 
purposes under the laws of the country in which the creditor is incorporated.90 
1.3.3 Japan 
If a debt payable (saimu menjo) is cancelled, Japan's general tax practice will recognize 
the income for income tax purposes in the hands of the debtor.91 Further, the whole 
amount of the cancelled debt will constitute the amount of taxable income regardless of 
the debtor's financial conditions.92 However, the taxable income may be set off against 
carryover losses (similar to section 20(1) (a) (ii) of the SA tax law).93 The carryover of 
losses is normally permitted for five years, but in some exceptional cases where the 
debtors' restructuring is involved it will carry over beyond the five-year period.94 
90 Taxation of Gains and losses on Claims Act no. 832 of October 2, 2002, Section 8 
91 Masatami Otsuka. December 2003. BNA International Inc forum. Host country Japan. Published by 
BNA International Inc; Subsection 2 
92 Supra 
93 Supra subsection III 











On the other hand, a creditor cannot deduct, for income tax purposes, the waived 
outstanding debts payable (saiken hoki).95Technically, a waiver by a creditor of its debt 
receivable is recharacterised as consisting of a two step transaction, the first being the 
collection from the debtor of the debt receivable and the second being the donation to the 
debtor of the money received.96 Even though the second transaction gives rise to a 
donation, such a donation expense is not deductible for income tax purposes.97 
1.3.5 Netherlands 
In the case of a conversion of a waiver of a debt the debtor will not be charged with a 
taxable gain.98 The Dutch legislation seems to place the burden on the creditors and is 
more lenient to the debtor. It might be that the drafter of the legislation took into account 
the fact that the debtor's financial position led to the debt waiver or conversion of the 
debt. Further, that the waiver or conversion will not result to a real taxable gain in the 
hands of the debtor. 
When dealing with the creditor, the term "group" is used to refer to the creditor and any 
affiliated related entities.99.The Dutch Corporation Tax Act ("CTA") allows corporate 
taxpayers (creditors) to offset a loss against the profits of the previous year, and the 
following nine years. IOO Therefore, a one year carry back period, and a nine year carry 
forward period will find application. 101 The CTA provides various anti-abuse provisions 
which have the effect of limiting the carryover of losses, where there is a change in 
ownership and where losses have been incurred by a holding companyl02 . For purposes 




98 Ola/van der Donk. Sigrid Hemels. February 2004. Proposed changes in Dutch Tax Law Will Facilitate 
Financial Restructurings,Subsection 1 
99 Supra 
100 Willem Bon. Michiel Beudeker. January 2009. Taxation o/Corporate Restructurings and the 













If a Dutch corporate lender waives a loan for business reasons, the CTA will allow him 
to deduct the loss arising from this write down. lo3 But if the waiver is done for 
shareholder's reasons (i.e. where it is not at arms length), the amount is for tax purposes 
to be treated as an (informal) distribution of profits by the lender. lo4 As a result, the loss 
is not deductible and such waiver might trigger Dutch dividend tax. 105 
The CT A also makes prOVISIOn for the converSIOn of write down debts, where a 
corporate lender is able to write down a loan against its taxable profits if the fair market 
value of the loan falls below the tax book values. lo6 In a situation where the loan 
subsequently recovers in value, a recapture of the written down loan will be required. lo7 
A mismatch may arise when a lender converts his loan into shares in the debtor as a 
consequence of the written down loan. lo8 In doing so he may have acquired shareholding 
that falls under the participation exemption. Essentially, the participation exemption 
applies if (1) the Dutch corporate taxpayer owns at least 5% of the nominal paid up share 
capital for the shareholding and (ii) the shareholding is not a so-called "low taxed passive 
investment company" 109. It exempts all benefits (such as dividends and capital gains) 
from the Dutch Corporation tax. IIO Case law has clarified the fact that the conversion of a 
loan into shares is not a reason to recognize taxable profits in relation to the debt for 
either the debtor or the lender and legislation has an anti-abuse provision to avoid this 
mismatch .. III 
103 Supra C.l 
104 Supra 
105 Supra 
















1.4 New developments 
Recent case law in South Africa highlights the importance of establishing the nature of 
the write off, set off or waiver of a debt owing 
1.4.1 Comparison between the ITC 1793 and the 2008 Kimberley Tax Court decision 
In the ITC 1793112 case, the testatrix sold shares to the value of R 2 628 340 to the 
appellant, being the family trust established by the testatrix. The appellant became liable 
to pay the testatrix a sum of R 2 628 340. The testatrix passed away on 15 March 2002 
and according to her will bequeathed the aforementioned debt to the trust ll3 . The court 
held that paragraph 12(5) of the Eighth Schedule of the Income Tax Act found 
application when the testatrix provided in her will that the trust be discharged from its 
debt and that this constituted a deemed disposal and further, that the trust was liable for 
capital gains tax on the amount of the discharged debt. 
Also, the court said, the set off of the debt was a result of the testatrix's, decision to 
discharge the appellant from its obligation to pay the debt. 114 Further, the creditor 
disposed of an asset when it discharged the trust debt for no consideration. This created a 
situation where the claim against the trust was extinguished by operation of law, by 
means of a set off between the estate and the beneficiary1l5. 
Moreover, it is not the occurrence of the set off that resulted to a discharge of the debt 
that is taxable in the hands of the debtor but the drawing up and the execution of the last 
will and testament at the time of the testator's deathY6 
In the unreported Tax Court case number 12399 the facts are similar to ITC 1793 but the 
court gave quite a surprising reasoning for its decision. The Commissioner relied heavily 
112 ITC 179367 SATC 256 
II3 Supra Pg 258 













on the latter case and contended that the debt owed by the appellant trust was discharged 
by the testatrix for no consideration and that the appellant had acquired the claim for no 
consideration as contemplated in paragraph 12(5)117. The Commissioner argued that the 
appellant was liable for payment of capital gains tax on the value of such claim1l8. Judge 
Lacock looked at the wording of the will and said that it is clear and unambiguous ll9. He 
further said that the intention of the testators was clear, that the residue of the estate is 
bequeathed to the appellant as the sole heir thereofl2o. He said that there were 
probabilities indicative that it was not the intention of the testatrix to specifically 
bequeath the debt represented by her loan account to the appellant as a legatee. 121 
He concluded that it was not the intention of the testatrix to specifically bequeath the 
claim in question and the loan account formed part of the residue ofthe estate 122 . That it 
was not her intention to dispose of this claim in favour of the appellant for no 
consideration as contemplated in paragraph 12(5) of the Eighth Schedule of the 
ActI23 .Therefore, the facts in ITC 1793 were deemed to be distinguished from case 
number 12399. 
In my view, the facts of these two cases are the same. It is just that the drafter of the will 
in case number 12399 was successful I submit, in hiding the fact that the testatrix wanted 
to benefit the trust without triggering paragraph 12(5). Case number 12399 merely 
opened doors for estate planners to avoid negative outcomes by carefully drafting wills 
giving effect to the testators wishes without necessarily forgiving the debt l24.That means 
a bequest in similar circumstances that is expressed as a residuary bequest, could avoid 
the capital gains tax catch discovered by ITC 1793. Both cases looked at the true 
intention of the testatrix so the drafter of the will should be careful of not only the 
117 Tax court Case no 12399(December 2008) para 6 
118 Supra 
119 Supra para 10 
120 Supra 10.1 
121 Supra 11 
122 Supra 12 
123 Supra 











significance of the specific language of the will but also that it conveys their true 
intention. 
Both cases discussed above were decided by the Tax Court and therefore, no legal 












2.1 Income tax sections relevant to losses on loans 
2.1.1 Introduction 
This chapter constitutes the focus of the paper since it will discuss each income tax provision 
relevant to the reduction or discharge of a debt. Debt waiver results to significant income tax 
consequences for both the debtor and the creditor. Amongst other relevant provisions, capital 
gains tax (CGT) consequences seem to be the most problematic and as a result, these will be 
discussed extensively. Irrespective of who waives (either the creditor or by operation of the 
law) the debt will still have income tax consequences. Creditors and debtors might even not be 
aware of the fact that debt forgiveness has occurred such as by prescription or on insolvency 
and liquidation as discussed in chapter one. 
When a creditor relinquishes a debt there are three fundamental tax consequences that can 
arise. The assessed loss provision in section 20 of the ITA is considered first because section 
8(4) (m) and paragraph 12(5) of the Eight Schedule are subject to the provisions of section 
20. 125 Section 20 (1) (a) (ii) of the Income Tax Act ('the Act") provides-
20(1) For the purpose of determining the taxable income derived by any person from 
carrying on any trade, there shall, subject to section 20A, be set off against the 
income so derived by such person -
(a) ...... .. 
(i) .... .. 
(ii) the balance of assessed loss shall be reduced by the amount or value of any 
benefit received by or accruing to a person resulting from a concession granted or a 
compromise made with any creditor of such person whereby any liability owed by 
such person to such creditor has been reduced or extinguished .126 











Section 8(4) (m) will apply where section 20 is inapplicable, i.e where there is no assessed loss. 
The section provides that where a debtor is released from an obligation to pay a debt and the 
debt was previously deducted for income tax purposes, a recoupment will arise. For example, a 
capital asset is purchased on credit, capital allowances are claimed and the debtor is not paid 
for some reason. 
Paragraph 12(5) of the Eighth is applicable to unpaid debt to the extent that section 20 and 
section 8(4) (m) are not applied. The paragraph applies where a debt has been reduced or 
discharged by a creditor for no consideration or a consideration less than market value of the 
debt owed. According to the SARS Capital Gains Tax guide, paragraph 12(5) was introduced 
to provide symmetry in the tax system by ensuring that any portion of the amount owing will 
be subject to capital gains tax on a capital gain equal to the amount discharged. 127However, as 
paragraph 12(5) is limited to amounts not taken into account in terms of sections 20 and 8(4) 
(m), any set off under these sections must reduce the amount subject to capital gains tax. 
While these three provisions are the most important ones, it is necessary to also consider the 
impact of a waiver for donations tax, secondary tax on companies (STC), value added tax 
(V A T) and fringe benefits purposes. 
2.2 Assessed loss provisions s 20(1) (a) (ii) 
Section 20(1 ) (a) (ii) provides -
"the balance of assessed loss shall be reduced by the amount or value of any benefit 
received by or accruing to a person resulting from a concession granted by or a 
compromise made with any creditor's of such person whereby any liability owed by 
such person to such creditor has been reduced or extinguished to the extent that 
(aa) the amount advanced by such creditor was used, directly or indirectly, to fund 
expenditure or an asset; and 
(bb) a deduction was allowed, in terms of section II, in respect of such expenditure 
or asset/28 











Silke has provided us with a formula of the section broken down into its various elements 129: I 
will briefly touch upon some but not all of these elements. 
~ There must be a benefit. 
~ The benefit must have a value or be an amount. 
~ The benefit must be received by the person concerned or accrued to the debtor. 
~ The conceSSIOn must result from a conceSSIOn granted or a compromIse made with 
creditors. 
~ The concession or compromise must result in the taxpayer's liabilities to the creditor being 
reduced or extinguished. 
~ The liabilities so reduced or extinguished must have arisen in the ordinary course of trade. 
In addition, an article written by Edward Nathan Sonnenberg Inc includes a short summary of 
principles established by the courts regarding this section. 
~ The reduction should be applied to the balance of assessed loss brought forward from 
the preceding year of assessment after accounting for taxable income or an assessed loss for the 
current year determined before the application of the reduction, i.e. the taxable income or 
assessed loss determined up to the date of the compromise or concession [CIR v Louis Zinn 
Organization (Pty) Ltd (1958) 22 SA TC 85]. 130 
~ In CIR v Datakor Engineering (Pty) Ltd (1998) 60 SATC 503 it was held that the 
words "any benefit" is of a wide and indeterminate meaning. The benefit, in the words 
of the Act, is to be found in the reduction or extinction of the debt. Thus, the 
concession by the creditors (to waive the balance of their eligible claims against the 
taxpayer in return for a nebulous right of redemption of redeemable preference shares) 
must of necessity translate into a benefit to the taxpayer. 131 
The term "concession" connotes a concept different from that of a compromise or an 
arrangement. In determining whether a concession has been granted, one must look at 
129 Silke . South African Income Tax 2009 LexisNexis Electronic version, Chapter 8. 129, June 2009 
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the position of the debtor and not the creditor. The mere substitution of a creditor's 
claim with a share amounts to a concession (Datakor supra). 132 
Compromise means an agreement or some mutual concession between parties where an 
adjustment of claims and disputes has taken place and not only a compromise as 
referred to in section 311 of the Companies Act, Act 61 of 1973.133 (see also discussion 
in 1.2.1) 
A concession or compromise could be with only one creditor or a general body of 
creditors. 134 
2.2.1 The benefit 
The word benefit is problematic because each person has a different view of what constitutes a 
benefit. Unfortunately, the Act does not provide a definition for "benefit' for the simple reason 
that it is not possible to point out exactly the qualities that will determine whether or not a 
benefit has been received 135. In the applicable case of Datakor, the court addressed the question 
of what constitutes a benefit and this is discussed in Chapter 4. 
2.2.2 Concession or compromise 
The terms "concession" and "compromise" are not defined but one may consult the definition 
of a "compromise" discussed in Chapter 1 to gain clarity. However, Silke states that a 
concession is when a creditor waived some of its rights for a consideration that is of a lesser 
value than the debt. The concession may be done by a single creditor or by all the creditors. 136 
SARS, in practice, inclines to the view that section 20(1) (a) (ii) applies even when one or only 
some of the creditors release a taxpayer from his debts. But this practice conflicts with the 
decision in Blue Moon Investments (PTy) Ltd v COT_1966 (4) SA 205 (RAD), 28 SATC 
















section 20(1) (a) (ii) applies only when a compromIse IS made with the general body of 
creditors and not merely with one or a few ofthe creditors. 137 
Support for the practice ofSARS was expressed by Melamet J as follows: 138 
'[Section] 20(1) (a) (ii) does not specifically require the concession to be granted by, 
or the compromise to be made with, the general body of the taxpayer's creditors. 
There is nothing in the wording of the [subsection to justifo such a limitation. The 
use of the plural 'creditors' and 'them' in themselves does not indicate that the 
general body or more than one creditor must make the concession to enter into the 
arrangement. 
'Subsection 6(b) of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 inter alia prOVides that: 'In 
every law unless the contrary appears words in the singular number include the 
plural, and words in the plural number include the singular. ' 
There is nothing in the context to indicate that the plural used in the section should 
not include the singular. On the contrary, it seems illogical to allow a taxpayer with 
an assessed loss to retain the full benefit of the allowance ifhe receives a concession 
conferring a large benefit from an individual creditor but not if such concession 
emanates from the general body of creditors. This savours of regarding such 
concession by the individual creditor as a windfall and runs contrary to the objective 
of the provisions which I have set out above. ' 
In my view, a waiver from a single creditor carries more weight because it comes from a single 
mind and is voluntary. In a case where the debtor has eight creditors and five agree to a 
compromise but the remaining three do not approve the decision, despite the minority 
disapproval the concession will be carried forward. Some of the creditors therefore may not 
voluntary agree to concessions and compromises yet they will still suffer income tax 
consequences arising from the concession or compromise agreed to by the majority. SARS is of 
the view that section 20(1) (a) (ii) does apply even when one or only some of the creditors 
release a taxpayer from his debts. l39 
137 Supra 
138 As yet unreported but quoted in Silke, South African Income Tax 2009 LexisNexis Electronic version, 












Some believe that a concession is different from a compromise or an arrangement. 140 Silke 
states that one has to look at the position of the debtor in determining the existence of a 
concession. Even a mere substitution of a creditor's claim with a share including redeemable 
fi h . 141 pre erence s ares, amounts to a concessIOn. 
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines a concession as-
"A thing that is conceded, a gesture made in recognition of a demand or prevailing 
standard or a 
reduction in price for a certain category of person. " 1-12 
While compromise is defined as -
" an agreement reached by each side making concessions, an intermediate state between conflicting 
opinions or the expedient accept standards that are lower than desirable. ,,1-13 
In exammmg the two definitions, it is evident that to some degree a "concession" is 
distinguished from a "compromise". A concession occurs when one party makes a unilateral 
decision to concede a debt or reduce a price for a certain category of person. On the other hand, 
a compromise consists of two parties, who each make concessions regarding a certain issue and 
try to reach an agreement on their differences and each party gives up something that they 
initially demanded. 
The law of contract defines a compromise as a settlement by agreement of disputed obligations, 
whether contractual or otherwise 144. But in practice, a concession and a compromise are 
considered to be similar and tax practitioners do not really spent too much time analysing these 
terms. This may be due to the fact that whichever occurs both are subject to section 20(a) 
(l )(ii). 
1-10 Silke South African Income Tax 2008 Electronic version 
/-II CIR v Datakor Engineering 60 SATC 503 
142 South African Concise Oxford Dictionary edited Pg 239 
/-13 Supra 237 












2.2.3 Subordination agreements vs. concession and compromise 145 
Kevin Burt makes an interesting concession point that a subordination agreement may be 
regarded as a concession granted by the company's creditors. 146 He discusses the legal effect of 
the subordination to illustrate the fact that it is similar to concession. 
According to Burt a subordination agreement embodies three separate agreements namely: 
~ an obligatory agreement whereby the company's creditors and the company undertake to 
extinguish existing obligations by the substitution thereof later (new) obligations (novatio 
. . ) 147 
In speCle . 
~ an agreement setting forth the terms of the latter (new) obligatory relationship; andl48 
~ a novating (or dispositive) agreement which actually affects the novation. 149 
He further states that its effects go beyond merely modifying the terms of the obligatory 
relationship existing between each of the company's creditors and the company, by for 
example, modifying the method of payment or extending the time for payment. ISO The existing 
obligations are extinguished by the later new obligations and the creditors will be regarded as 
having a concession to the company. Consequently, the proviso in section 20 will find 
application due to the creditor's claim that has either been reduced or extinguished. 151 
I disagree with Burt's contention. As he stated, a novation is an agreement whereby one 
obligation is extinguished and is replaced with a new obligatory relationship. In order for 
novation to be effective, there has to be an existence of an intention to affect the novation. 
I do not think a subordination agreement is similar to or the same as a conceSSIOn. For 
concession, a creditor gives up his right to claim or claims an amount that is less than the debt 

















in dispute, while in a novation agreement the debt is substituted but the debtor is still liable to 
pay the new obligation. If Burt's concession is correct, the amount in the agreement will 
reduce the debtor's assessed loss. Further, the debtor still has to meet the conditions laid down 
in the new obligatory agreement (that is to payoff the new debt). The difference between a 
novation and a concession is that the novation does not extinguish the debt; it substitutes the 
old obligations with the new obligation. 152 As he said, it merely modifies the payment method 
or extends the time of payment. It is incorrect to treat the subordination agreement as a 
concession because the debtor does not receive any benefit and his assessed loss cannot be 
reduced. The only similarly between the two agreements is that they both replace old 
obligations for new ones, but a novation agreement does not extinguish the debt. I seem to 
find support from TE Brincker where he states that 
"Subordinated loans have gained popularity since the decision of the Appellate 
Division in Ex Parte De Vi/liers and Another NNO: In Re Carbon Developments 
(Proprietary) Limited (In Liquidation) 1993 1 SA 493 (A). J53 As opposed to 
capitalising a company, recourse is now often had to subordinating loan accounts or 
other claims against the company in order to enable it to continue trading. J5.1It was 
indicated in the De Villiers case that subordination does not result in a company's 
assets exceeding its liabilities (the so-called insolvency test). It merely enables a 
company to continue paying its creditors as and when they become due (the so-
called liquidity test). 155 
I concur with Brincker where he states" It merely enables a company to continue paying 
its creditors as and when they become due (the so-called liquidity test) ".156 
This indicates that the subordination agreement does not have the effect of extinguishing or 
reducing the debt as required in S 20( 1)( a )(ii). 
152 Supra 
153 TE Brincker, Taxation Principles of Interest and other Financing Transactions Issue 6 . March 2009 
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2.2.4 Ordinary course of trade 
The Act provides that any balance of assessed loss incurred shall be reduced by an amount or 
value of the benefit received by a debtor, resulting from a compromise or concession granted 
by creditors if the liabilities which have been reduced or extinguished arose in the ordinary 
course of trade. This means that only debts arising out of trading activities can be considered 
for the set off. 
2.3 Recoupment provision s 8(4) (m) 
When the debtor does not have any assessed losses or the debt has prescribed section 8(4) (m) 
may apply. If the taxpayer did not deduct any expenditure or allowances in the current or 
previous years of assessment in respect of the debt, section 8(4)(m ) will also not apply and 
paragraph 12(5) will then find application. 
Section 8(4)(m) provides that 
"Subject to the provisions of, section 20 where-
(i) as a result of the cancellation, termination or variation of an agreement or due to 
the prescription, waiver or release of a claim for payment, any 
person was during any year of assessment relieved or partially relieved from the 
obligation to make payment of any expenditure actually incurred; 
(ii) such expenditure was at the date on which such person was so relieved or 
partially relieved not paid; and (iii) such expenditure or any allowance in relation 
to such expenditure was in the current or any previous year of assessment allowed as 
a deduction from such person's income, 
such person shall for the purposes of paragraph (a) be deemed to have recovered or 
recouped an amount equal to the amount of the obligation from which the person 
was so relieved or partially relieved during the year of assessment in which the 
person was so relieved or partially relieved". 
This section does not seem to be too problematic. If a taxpayer claimed any deductions in 











if the debt is wiped out. The section provides for equilibrium in the tax system by ensuring that 
there is an inclusion in income for a deduction previously claimed which is no longer incurred. 
The section was legislated to include amounts that did not fall under the general recoupment 
provision -section 8(4)(a).157 Section 8(4)(a) refers to amounts 'recovered or recouped' and 
therefore it could be argued would not include a debt forgiven as no amount is received. 
Section 8(4) (m) is subject to section 20, therefore, it will not apply to amounts which have 
been taken into account in reducing the taxpayers balance of assessed 10SS.158 If the value of 
the compromise benefit exceeds the assessed loss, the excess might be taxable. 159It must be 
noted that s 8(4)(m) states "subject to" and not "to the extent that" . 
It has been held that l60 : 
'The words "subject to" can, depending upon the context in which they are used, 
infer or determine the existence of a condition precedent, or amount to no more than 
the term of an agreement. Where those words appear in a statutory provision 
" ... [gJenerally speaking, the words 'subject to' have the effect of introducing a 
qualification, limitation or condition precedent, thereby curtailing a person's 
exercise of otherwise unrestricted rights. It does not, in this sense, mean an 
alternative or optional right without affecting an unfettered original right. " 
'(Per Goldin J in Hickman v The Attorney-General 1980 (2) SA 583 (R) at 585E-F.) 
'In other statutory provisions, the same words may mean "except as curtailed by" 
'Depending on the context, the same words can prescribe the manner and fashion in 
which certain powers and duties may, or must be exercised . ... 
157 Olivier.L Reduction or discharge of debts: The Hidden tax dangers, Stellenbosch Law Review Journal 
2006 Volume 7, Issue 2,303 
158 Silke. South African Income Tax, subsection 4,64B 2009 
159 Supra 
160 By Hancke J in CIR, Transkei, and another v JALC Holdings (SA) (Ply) Ltd and another 1991 (4) SA 
646 (Tk), 54 SATC 7 at 10-11 (on appeal as Moodie v CIR, Transkei, and another; CIR, Transkei, and 
another v Moodie and another 1993 (2) SA 501 (Tk AD) 55 SATC 164). See the authorities cited there; 











The words "subject to" could also constitute a condition precedent, meaning that a 
test or action must be completed, that something has to take place before the 
agreement does in fact become binding upon the parties thereto. .. .' 
Despite the cited authorities, in my opinion, "subject to" should infer that in an event where 
section 20 finds relevance, section 8(4)(m) is not applicable. Further, that section 20 prevails 
over section 8(4)(m) and if the amount was taken into account into reducing the taxpayer's 
balance of assessed loss, the excess should not be taxable in terms of section 8(4 )(m) .161 For 
example, Debtor A is released from its debt obligation amounting to R 500 by creditor B. 
Debtor A has an assessed loss of R 300 and, the R 500 waived by Creditor B will be set off 
against the assessed loss ofR 300. 
The R 200 excess/ remainder cannot be taken into account in determining whether or not there 
has been a recoupment in terms of section 8(4 )(m) . This is due to the fact that where section 20 
is applicable the amount has been subjected to tax regardless of the limit imposed by the 
assessed loss amount. It must be noted at this point that the R 200 excess will however, fall 
under paragraph 12(5) of the Eighth Schedule. 
In CIR v Louis Zinn Organisation the court chose not to decide whether or not section 8(4)(a) 
was meant to include a compromise benefit as a taxable recoupment. 162 
The main purpose of section 8(4)(m) is to ensure that any debtor, relinquished from his 
obligations to pay a debt either partially or fully where the underlying expense was deducted in 
terms of section 11, incurs a recoupment. 163 
Olivier makes an interesting observation. She examines the situation where a creditor cedes a 
debt owed to him to another and receives a concession for the cession. l64 She says, section 
161 Supra 
162 CIR V louis Zinn Organisation 22 SATC 85 
163 Lynette Olivier Organisation, Reduction or Discharge of debt: The Hidden tax danger Stellenbosch 












8(4)(m) will not apply because the debtor is still required to pay the debt but to a different 
person .165 Therefore it cannot be argued that the debtor has been released from his or her 
obligation to pay. 166 I concur that the fact that an obligation has been shifted to a new creditor 
or substituted by a new one does not mean that the debtor has been released from his obligation 
to pay. 
Justification for the recoupment arising in terms of section 8(4) (m) is found in the fact that the 
debt released was deducted for income tax purposes. 167 Since the amount deducted is no longer 
payable, it makes sense for it to be added back to the taxpayer's taxable income. 168 For 
example, A buys trading stock for R50 000 on credit from B. A incurs a section II(a) 
deduction for R 50 000. If the R 50 000 is waived, a recoupment must occur to reverse the 
deduction albeit in a different year. 
It must also be noted that section 8( 4)(m) specifically includes prescription of debt (discussed 
in chapter 1) where as section 20( 1) does not. 
2.4 Paragraph 12(5) o(the Eighth Schedule 
This is a catch all section created to tax waiver arrangements that were able to escape section 
8(4)(m) or section 20(1)(a)(ii) and tax any excess of the discharged or reduced amount after 
these two sections have been applied. In addition if the debtor did not have an assessed loss 
and did not deduct any expenditure in terms of section 11, the amount waived will be subject 
to capital gains tax ("CGT") in terms of paragraph 12(5) of the Eighth Schedule. The 
paragraph ensures that the same amount is not taxed twice. This is clear from the wording in 
paragraph 12(5) which excludes in (ii)(aa)B any amount taken into account in terms of section 
















Paragraph 12( 5) provides that 169 
(5) (a) Subject to paragraph 67, this subparagraph applies where a debt owed by a 
person to a creditor has been reduced or discharged by that creditor-
(1 )for no consideration; or 
(ii )for a consideration which is less than the amount by which the face value of the 
debt has been so reduced or discharged, 
Some basic rules and definitions of CGT are discussed below in order to achieve a better 
understanding of how paragraph 12(5) operates. 
2.4.1 Determining a capital gain or loss 
The Eighth Schedule provides for four key definitions (Asset, Disposal, Proceeds and Base 
Cost) which form the basic building blocks in determining a capital gain or loss. 170 
2.4.1.1 Asset 
An asset is widely defined and includes any property of whatever nature and any interest 
therein. CGT applies to all assets disposed of on or after 1 October 2001 (valuation date), 
whether or not the asset was acquired before, on or after that date. Only the capital gain 
accruing from 1 October 2001 will be subject to CGT. 
2.4.1.2 Disposal 
The concept of disposal covers any event, act, forbearance or operation of law which results 
in a creation, variation, transfer or extinction of an asset. It also includes certain events treated 
as disposals, such as the change in the use of an asset, or a donation. 
2.4.1.3 Proceeds 
Once an asset is disposed for an amount which is received by or which accrues to the seller of 
the asset that amount constitutes the proceeds from the disposal. 171 If it is a deemed disposal 
such as a donation then the proceeds would be equal to the market value of the asset. 
169 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 












2.4.1.4 Base Cost 
The base cost of an asset is generally the expenditure actually incurred in acquiring the asset 
together with expenditure directly related to its improvement and direct costs in respect of its 
acquisition and disposal and certain holding costs172. The base cost does not include any 
amounts allowed as a deduction against ordinary income, such as a capital allowance on plant 
and machinery. 173 
2.4.2 Paragraph 12(5) 
Ifparagraph 12(5) did not exist, there would be no COT implications for the debtor making the 
gain and there would only be COT implications for the creditor who incurs a loss. The main 
purpose of the paragraph is to tax a benefit received by the debtor where a debt owed by it has 
been reduced for no consideration or for an amount that is less than the face value of that debt 
and such a benefit has not been taken into account in terms of section 8(4)(m) or section 
20(1 )(a)(ii). 
As said earlier, COT consists of four building blocks and all must be present to trigger a COT 
event. If there was no para 12(5) the waiver of a debt transaction would not meet all of these 
criteria. Paragraph 12(5) has the effect of deeming the benefit received by the debtor to be a 
benefit and ultimately an asset. 
According to paragraph 20, the base cost of the asset (being the creditors claim) is the amount 
spent by the creditor in creating it (that is the capital amount of the loan). 174 In a case where the 
creditor waives the debt and the asset is extinguished, this leads to a disposal in terms of 
paragraph 11(1). 175 The proceeds of the disposal will be equal to the amount discharged by the 















Therefore, the proceeds are equal to the base cost. 176 As a result ofthe waiver or cancellation of 
the debt, the creditor does not make any capital gain 177. In tum, there are no capital gains tax 
consequences for the debtor flowing from the waiver or cancellation. RC Williams regards the 
latter point as important and as I understand it, might be one of the reasons why paragraph 
12(5) was inserted into the Eighth Schedule. 
One of the most contentious issues is whether paragraph 12(5) also applies to a scenario where 
the creditor writes off the obligation of the debtor as a bad debt. 178 Also when the debt becomes 
prescribed (see chapter 1), it might seem as if the creditor has discharged the debt for no 
consideration. 179 In a liquidation (see chapter 1) scenario, a creditor still has to lodge a claim, 
even though it is aware that the debtor may not necessarily be able to discharge a debt. 18o 
Lodging the claim would show that the creditor did not waive or reduce the debt and paragraph 
12(5) does not find application. 
The SARS CGT guide provides two reasons why this paragraph was legislated. 
1. To ensure that the debtor relieved from obligation to pay any amount owing will be subject 
to CGT on a capital gain equal to the amount discharged .. 
2. To have symmetry in the tax system by ensuring that there is a matching of capital gains 
with losses. Meaning, the debtor relieved from the obligation is subject to CGT, while the 
creditor who waived the debt owed will be able to claim a capital loss in respect of the 
losses suffered as a consequence of the waiver l81. 
I fully agree with the fact that symmetry in the tax system was needed, because the debtor gains 
some form of a benefit and should be subjected to CGT. In fact, it might even amount to a 
double benefit. For instance, the debtor acquires a loan to participate in a productive business 
transaction and gains profit. In addition he is subsequently released from the obligation to pay 
176 Supra 
177 Supra 
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the loan. It's a double benefit because, he makes a profit from the business transaction and, is 
released from his obligation to pay the loan that enables him to transact. 
On the other hand, the facts might be different. The debtor might be sinking in debts and 
although he is being released from one of his obligations to pay, it is not really significant in his 
financial position and does not really constitute a benefit. SARS will include the amount as a 
capital gain in the taxpayer's taxable income, but the taxpayer is in an assessed loss position. 
Ultimately, SARS does not receive anything because of the assessed loss. The debtor cannot 
pay his debts and there is no hope that he will recover from his insolvent position. The fact that 
he does not have to also pay tax can hardly be a benefit to him. This illustration goes back to 
what was said earlier that a benefit has different meanings dependent on individual 
circumstances. 
2.4.3 The treatment of the parties to the waiver 
If a debtor is subject to CGT in terms of paragraph 12(5) , the creditor will be entitled to claim 
a capital loss in terms of paragraph 56(2)(a).182 This achieves the second reason of matching 
furnished by SARS for the introduction of this paragraph. If no capital gain arises on the part of 
the debtor, paragraph 56(2)(a) does not apply and the creditor cannot claim the loss suffered. 
Paragraph 12(5) complies with the four building blocks discussed above as follows: 
Asset: The Debtor is deemed to have acquired a claim to the debt reduced or discharged. 
Base cost: the base cost of the asset is deemed to be nil as nothing is incurred. 
Proceeds: The proceeds are determined as follows: 
~ If the debtor paid nothing -the amount discharged or reduced. 
~ If the debtor paid something - the difference between the amount paid and the amount 
discharged or reduced. 
Disposal: The claim acquired by the debtor is deemed to be disposed of as the debt is 
extinguished. 











In short, the debtor will have a capital gain equal to the amount of the debt that has been 
discharged or reduced less any amount paid to the creditor. 183 
2.5 Paragraph 38 and 56 ofthe Eighth schedule 
Paragraph 38 states that 
(1) Subject to subparagraph (2) and paragraphs 12 (5) and Q2 where a person 
disposed of an asset by means of a donation or for a consideration not measurable in 
money or to a person who is a connected person in relation to that person for a 
consideration which does not reflect an arm's length price-
(a) 
the person who disposed of that asset must be treated as having dis-posed of that 
asset for an amount received or accrued equal to the market value of that asset as at 
the date of that disposal; and 
[Item (a) substituted by s. 63 (1) (a) of Act No. 320(2004.] 
Jb) 
the person who acquired that asset must be treated as having acquired that asset at a 
cost equal to that market value, which cost must be treated as an amount of 
expenditure actually incurred and paid for the purposes of paragraph 20 (1) (a). 
[Sub-para. (1) (previously para. 38) amended by s. 87 (1) (a) of Act No. 600(2001 
and by s. 81 of Act No. 740(2002. Item (b) substituted by s. 87 (1) (b) of Act No. 60 
0(2001 deemed to have come into operation on 1 October, 2001.] 
Paragraph 38 applies where a person disposes of an asset to a connected person, for a 
consideration that does not reflect an arms length price. 184 In such a case, the connected person 
will be deemed to have disposed of the asset for an amount equal to its market value at the time 
of the disposal. 185 And, the acquirer will be deemed to have acquired the asset at a cost equal to 
that same market value. 186 A connected person of a trust, for example, is a beneficiary, and a 
connected person of that beneficiary is his or her relative. 187 
183 SARS CGT Guide 2007 
m MStein . Capital Gains Tax 2008 Electronic version Lexisnexis 
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A relative is defined in section 1 of the Income Tax Act as "in relationto any person, means the 
spouse of such person or anybody related to him or his spouse within the third degree of 
consanguinity, or any spouse of anybody so related, and for the purpose of determining the 
relationship between any child referred to in the definition of "child" in this section and any 
other person, such child shall be deemed to be related to its adoptive parent within the first 
degree of consanguinity"; 
Connected persons may only set off capital losses against capital gains made when transacting 
with the same connected persons. If an asset is sold at a capital loss to a trust, the seller (i.e who 
is also a beneficiary) may only set off the losses suffered against the capital gains incurred 
through the sale of another asset to that truSt. 188 Further, the loss may only be deducted against 
the capital gain if the disposals occurred in the same or any later year of assessment as the later 
transaction that resulted to a capital gain. 
Paragraph 38 is made subject to paragraph 12(5), as a result, ifparagraph 12(5) applies, section 
38 will not find application. Therefore, when the founder waives a trust debt, paragraph 12(5) 
applies and paragraph 38 will be inapplicable. In consequence, no proceeds will arise and this 
results to a capital loss for the creditor of the amount waived which they can claim 189 against 
capital gains even if the debtor and creditor are connected persons. 
2.5.1 Donations and Paragraph 38 
It must be noted that while a waiver of a trust debt gives rise to capital gains tax, a donation of 
cash to a trust would not amount to a disposal of an asset leading to proceeds for capital gains 
tax purposes. 190 This is due to the fact that," cash" is excluded from the definition of an asset in 













A donation means a donation in the common law sense of the word. 191Namely, a transaction 
under which motivated by liberality, a person makes a disposal completely gratuitously. 192 For 
the purposes of paragraph 38, the founder's gratuitous waiver of the debt would amount to a 
donation. 193 Thus, the donor is deemed to have disposed of the debt for an amount received or 
accrued equal to the market value of the asset as at the date ofthe disposal. 194 
2.5.2 Paragraph 56 
Paragraph 56(1) provides that a creditor waiving the debt owed by a debtor who is his or her 
connected person must disregard a capital loss determined in consequence of the disposal. 195 A 
founder and his family trust for example are generally connected persons. Paragraph 56 (1) 
finds application when the founder creditor disposes of a claim owed by the debtor trust. 196If 
the debt waiver amounts to a capital gain in the hands ofthe debtor in terms of paragraph 12(5), 
the creditor can claim a capital loss suffered in terms of paragraph 56(2).197 Paragraph 56(2)(a) 
has the effect of suspending the application of paragraph 56(1) so that tax equity is achieved. 
RC Williams alerts us to an unintended consequence of this paragraph; 
" should the creditor dispose of a claim against a connected person in relation to 
that creditor to another person at a loss, and in that other persons hand's a capital 
gains arises which is included in his or her aggregate capital gain or loss, the 
creditor may not claim the capital loss that he has suffered. 
The addition of paragraph 56( d) has the result that where the creditor can prove that 
the capital gain was brought into account in the determination of the other person's 
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Since paragraph 56 is discussed, it is necessary to also consider Paragraph 39. Paragraph 39 (1) 
(a) provides that a person must disregard a capital loss determined on the disposal of an asset to 
a person who was his connected person immediately before the disposal. 199 A capital loss 
disregarded in paragraph 39(1) may in terms of paragraph 39(2) be deducted from capital gains 
made by him on disposals of assets during the same or subsequent years of assessment to the 
same person to whom the disposal giving rise to the capital loss was made, as long as they are 
still connected persons at the time of those subsequent disposals.2oo If no further transactions 
are made with that connected person the loss is forever lost. However, if paragraph 56 applies 
then set off against other (unconnected) gains can still take place. 
2.6 Donations tax. Secondary tax on Companies. Value added Tax and fringe benefits tax 
2.6.1 Donations Tax 
A further aspect that needs to be considered is a probable donations tax liability in terms of 
section 54 of the Income Tax Act201 that may arise as a consequence of debt forgiveness. 
Donations tax was introduced to limit the avoidance of tax by providing gifts resulting to a 
reduction of liability for income tax ofthe donor, while income derived from the donated assets 
is spread among more taxpayers who may have lower marginal tax rates.202 
Section 55 defines a donation as any gratuitous disposal of property including any gratuitous 
waiver or renunciation of a right. 203 In ITC 1448 the court accepted that; 
"a adiation by Mrs A was a 'gratuitous disposal of property' and hence a donation 
as defined in s 55 (1)(ii). That it amounted to a disposal of property was common 
cause. That 'gratuitous', 'gratis' in the Afrikaans text, meant given for nothing, 
without charge, free, was also not in dispute". 20~ 
199 Supra 
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Suffice to say, a disposition is gratuitous if it is given for nothing, without charge or for 
free. 205In a case of debt waivers, a disposal of a right to claim (the waiver of the debt) by the 
creditor might constitute a gratuitous disposal. However, SARS has not yet charged donations 
tax on a creditor who waived a debt. The reason might be that SARS understands the 
difficulty of proving a "gratuitous disposal" and in some cases a waiver is not driven by 
liberal or generous intentions on the part ofthe creditor. 
A donation in a form of a waiver of a portion of a debt owing to the donor, amounts to a 
deemed disposal and acquisition for capital gains tax purposes ( refer to discussion in paragraph 
2.5.1)?06 The debtor is deemed to have acquired a claim to the portion of the debt that was 
reduced or discharged for no consideration and for a base cost of nil. 207 Further, the debtor is 
deemed to have disposed of the claim for proceeds equal to the amount that was reduced or 
discharged. 
In Japan, a debt waived by a creditor amounts to a donation to the debtor. However, although 
the waiver leads to a donation, the creditor cannot deduct the deduction as an expense (see 
discussion in Chapter 1 paragraph 1.3.3). It appears that Japan and South Africa are in 
agreement that the waiver of a debt constitutes a donation. 
As an alternative to WaIvmg the loan, it is suggested that a debtor repays the debt and 
subsequently, the creditor donates the payment to the debtor. In essence, this still amounts to a 
reduction or discharge of the debt but it does not attract capital gains tax due to the fact that 
there is no disposal of an asset (release of right to claim payment by means of a waiver). 
However, the donation might, from the creditor's position, trigger donations tax. 
This option might not be practical, considering the fact that the debt is being waived because 
the debtor is unable to repay it and it might not have the funds to settle the debt even though the 
creditor will eventually donate the payment back to the debtor. 
205 ITC no 1448 (/988) 51 SATC 58(C) 












2.6.2 Secondary tax on companies ("STC") 
It is necessary to briefly consider section 64(C) of the ITA in determining whether a waiver of 
a right can constitute a deemed dividend in the hands of the debtor. Section 64C (2)(b) of the 
ITA provides that, for the purposes of S 64B208 , an amount shall be deemed to be a dividend 
declared by a company to a shareholder, where any shareholder or any connected person in 
relation to that shareholder is released or relieved from any obligation measurable in money 
which is owed to that company by that shareholder or connected person., to the extent that the 
amount so owed was not already deemed to be a dividend declared by that company in terms of 
paragraph (g) However, section 64(C)(4)(k) of the ITA exempts the debtor from STC if the 
debtor and the creditor are in the same group of companies. If the debtor and creditor are not 
part of the same group of companies then there will be an STC liability of 10% of the amount 
waived. 
In the Netherlands a loss arising from the waiver of a loan for business reasons is allowed as a 
deduction. However if the waiver was not arms length it will be treated as an informal 
distribution of profit by the lender. The loss will not be deductible and will be subject to the 
Dutch dividend tax (refer to paragraph 1.3.5) 
2.6.3 Value added Tax ("VAT) 
A debt reduction might also have Value Added Tax consequences. Section 22(3) of the Value 
Added Tax Act ("VAT ACT") is similar to section 8(4)(m) of the Income Tax Act. Section 
22(3) provides that, where a vendor who accounts for tax on the invoice basis has previously 
claimed an input tax deduction, but has not paid the full consideration within twelve months 
from the expiry of the period in which the deduction has been made, he is required to account 
for output tax in relation to the amount still outstanding. The twelve months is determined from 
the end of the tax period during which the input tax was claimed, and the vendor is required to 
account for output tax during the tax period immediately following the twelve month period. 











Section 22(3) of the V AT Act has a proviso, namely, that where a written contract has been 
entered into providing that the debtor makes payment on a specific date and the debtor fails to 
make payment on the agreed date, the debtor becomes liable for output tax within twelve 
months from the end of the month in which he was liable to make payment.209 
Amongst other issues, the section affects inter group loan accounts which relate to the taxable 
supply of goods and services. If the relevant debt is not paid within twelve months, the debtor 
group entity will have to account for output tax. A corresponding input tax deduction may only 
be claimed by the debtor once he has made payment. 
Although capital gains tax and income tax may not have much impact on a debtor in an 
assessed loss position as no tax is payable, the physical repayment of the value added tax debt 
will have an impact on the debtor.2lO For income tax purposes, the debt can only become bad 
after the payment date has passed. 
2.6.4 Seventh Schedule- fringe benefits 
Paragraph 2(h) of the Seventh Schedule to the IT A provides that a benefit will arise if an 
employer pays an amount owing by an employee to a third person, without requiring 
reimbursement by the employee.211 A benefit will also arise if the employer releases any 
employee from the obligation to pay an amount owing by the employee to the employer. The 
amount to be included in the gross income ofthe employee is the amount that was owed by the 
employee. 
Section 8 (4)(m) will not find application in circumstances were the employer releases an 
employee from an obligation to pay. This is due to the fact that generally, the amount borrowed 
was not used for expenditure incurred in the production of income. Further, if the amount was 
used to fund such expenditure, that expenditure was not eligible for a section 11 deduction to 
209 Supra 
210 L Olivier. Reduction or discharge of debts: The Hidden Tax dangers Pg 312 











be deducted from the employee's gross income. For this reason it was necessary to include this 













3.1 List of Case Studies 
In this chapter 6 case studies will be presented illustrating the relevant income tax issues faced 
by parties to debt reduction transactions. Chapter four will then carefully discuss each case 
study taking into account the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act ("IT A") and 
definitions discussed in the previous chapters. 
A diagram illustrating the facts to be used in the case studies is presented below: 
Fellow subsidiary 






(Case study 7) 
Holdco (Pty) Ltd ("Holdco") holds all the shares in Chancer (Pty) Ltd ("Chancer"). Chancer is 
in the business of manufacturing cosmetics. At 31 December 2008 (Chancer's financial year-













Loan from National Development Corporation("NDC") 
Bank Overdraft 
Holdco creditor for management fees 
ABC Ltd (a third party) for accounting services 
Accumulated Losses (also assessed) 
Trading Stock 
Building 












The loan balances include the following accrued interest: NDC R 300 000, Bank overdraft 
R200000. 
The NDC loan stood at R 5000000 just before year-end, which included accrued interest 
of R 1 800 000. An amount of R 1 500 000 was then repaid. The repayment notice did not 
mention which part of the repayment was interest, neither does the loan agreement stipulate 
which part of any repayments would be interest or capital. The management fees where of a 
capital nature. 
The building was financed with the R 1 000 000 share capital, R 4 000 000 from the 
Shareholder's loan and R 3 000 000 from the NDC loan. Income tax allowances of R 450 000 
have been claimed on the building. 
The following case studies are now presented based on the above facts. For this purpose the 
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3.1.1 Case study 1 
The creditor (HoldCo) applies for the liquidation of Chancer. HoldCo can expect to receive 60 
cents for each Rand as will all the other creditors. 
3.1.2 Case study 2 
In order to strengthen the balance sheet of Chancer, Holdco agrees to convert R 4 000 000 of 
the shareholder's loan to ordinary share capital. 
3.1.3 Case study 3 compromise 
In terms of the agreement with NDC an amount of R 5 000 000 of the loan is automatically 
released because the South African economy has officially been in recession for more than a 
year. 
3.1.4 Case study 4 debtor's voluntary liquidation 
Chancer decides to go into voluntary liquidation. The creditors can expect to receive 60 cents 
for each Rand. 
3.1.5 Case Study 5 
Holdco cedes its shareholder's loan and sells its 100% shareholding to a fellow group 
company. 
The Income Tax consequences resulting from the losses incurred in each case study will be 












4.1 Application and discussion of the Income Tax consequences of the case studies 
4.1.1 Case Study 1 
Question - The creditor (HoldCo) applies/or the liquidation of Chancer. HoldCo can expect to 
receive 60 cents for each Rand as will all other creditors. 
4.1.1.1 Paragraph 12.5 
Paragraph 12.5 of the Eighth Schedule applies where a debt owed by a person to a creditor is 
reduced or discharged for no consideration or for a consideration which is less that the amount 
by which the face value of the debt has been reduced or discharged. The person is deemed to 
have disposed of a claim which may be subject to CGT. Paragraph 12(5) does not apply where 
the debtor and the creditors are members of the same group of companies. 
On the basis that HoldCo and Chancer are members of the same group of companies, the above 
exemption should find application in this scenario. Therefore, no capital gain accrues to 
Chancer in terms of paragraph 12(5) in respect of the Holdco Loan. 
4.1.1.2 Section 20(1)(a) 
Section 20(1)(a) of the ITA provides that where a liability owing by a person that is in an 
assessed loss position has been reduced or extinguished as a result of a concession granted by 
or a compromise made with any creditors, the balance of that person's assessed loss will be 











4.1.1. 3 Section 8(4)(m) 
In terms of section 8(4)(m) of the ITA 
a taxable recoupment will arise if?12 
i) a person is relieved from the obligation to make payment of any expenditure actually 
incurred; 
ii) as a result of the cancellation, termination or variation of an agreement or due to the 
prescription, waiver or release of a claim for payment; 
iii) if such expenditure was not paid; and 
iv) such expenditure or any allowance in relation to such expenditure was allowed as a 
deduction. 
The loan owing by Chancer to HoldCo will be partly extinguished upon liquidation and 
creditors will only receive 60% of their claims against Chancer, Therefore, requirement ( i) of 
section 8( 4)(m) is met as Chancer is relieved from part of its obligation and will only pay 60% 
of the debts. Moreover, requirement (ii) is also met due to the fact that the relief is a result of 
creditors waiving or releasing 40% oftheir debts owed by Chancer. 
In applying requirement ii) it is imperative to note that the relief from the obligation to make 
payment must flow from a cancellation, termination or variation of an agreement or due to the 
prescription, waiver or release of a claim for payment. In determining whether the dissolution 
of the loan at hand upon liquidation is due to the waiver of a claim to make payment I will 
simply refer to the discussion in Chapter 2. 
Based on Christie's law of Contract and case law (Ex Parte Sussens , Pretorous v Greyling) 
discussed in Chapter 2 it would appear that in the current circumstances, a waiver will only 
exist if HoldCo deliberately surrenders its rights to claim payment in terms of the loan or 
commits an unequivocal act with the intention to waive such rights. 











Chancer is placed in creditor's liquidation. The loan (which existed prior to the initiation of the 
liquidation process) is partly extinguished as a result of the liquidation process and not 'due to 
a waiver by HoldCo of its claim for payment. This is on the basis that there is no unequivocal 
act performed by HoldCo with the intention to waive its rights for payment against Chancer in 
terms of the loan agreement. 
Further note the comments of Munnik AJ in the Union Free State Mining case213 
" 1 do not think that a creditor can by the mere exercise of his will terminate the 
obligation without the concurrence of the debtor because as both Wessels [para 
2344A] and Pothier [s578] point out a release, waiver or abandonment is 
tantamount to making a donation to the debtor of the obligation from which he is to 
be released and until that donation has been accepted it has not been perfected. " 
In application of the above, it appears that, as in the case of a waiver, a release similarly 
requires the creditor (HoldCo) to perform an act whereby it deliberately surrenders its rights. 
Assuming that Chancer has accepted the 40% waiver of the claim from HoldCo, I am of the 
view that the extinguishing of the loan owing by Chancer constitutes a 'release of a claim for 
payment by HoldCO. Accordingly requirement ii) of section 8( 4)(m) should be met because 
HoldCo voluntarily submitted Chancer to liquidation and Chancer accepted the offer. HoldCo 
knew that in a liquidation process, they would get a consideration less than the amounts owed 
by Chancer. This is a clear indication that HoldCo surrendered its rights to claim full payment 
from Chancer of the debts owed. 
However, Chancer may resist to the applicability of section 8(4)(m) as it not clear from the 
facts whether or not Chancer has accepted the release. Chancer may find support in the latter 
quoted decision taken by Munnik AJ in the Union Free State Mining case. But the 
Commissioner may argue, the fact that Chancer has not repudiated the release of the claim is a 
clear indication that Chancer accepts the release and is relieved from its obligation to pay the 
outstanding debt. 











Requirement iii) is also met for the reason that the creditors debts are outstanding (as reflected 
on the balance sheet) hence all creditors would be only paid 40% of their debts. With regards to 
requirement iv) section 8(4)(m) only applies where the expenditure giving rise to the loan was 
either claimed directly as a deduction or indirectly as a capital allowance. The latter 
requirement is not met to the extent that HoldCo's debt arose from capital expenditure namely 
the Management fees. The Management fees were not deducted by Chancer as the expenditure 
was of a capital nature and did not qualify for a deduction. 
The same argument will also apply in respect of the other creditors, however as expenditure of 
R450 000 (building allowances) and R50 000 (accounting services) has been deducted, there 
would be a section 8(4)(m) recoupment of RR500 000 in respect of the ABC Ltd and NDC 
loans. 
As I said above, paragraph 12(5) will not be applicable in this instance as HoldCo and Chancer 
are members of the same group of companies (member of the same group are exempt from the 
application of paragraph 12(5)). 
4.1.2 Case Study 2 
Question - In order to strengthen the balance sheet of Chancer, Holdco agrees to convert R 4 
000 000 of the shareholder's loan to ordinary share capital. 
4.1.2.1 Section 20(1)(a)(ii) of the ITA 
In terms of section 20, a compromise with any creditor reduces the assessed loss. However not 
all liabilities reduce an assessed 10SS.214 They must be liabilities incurred in the ordinary course 
of trade. In the facts at hand Chancer claimed an income tax allowance of R 450 000 in respect 
of a building financed partly by means of a loan from its shareholder. Section 20 applies 
because the debt arose in the ordinary course of trade (regardless of whether deductions or 
allowances where claimed) and Chancer has an assessed loss. In some instances, the write off 
of this type of loan will give rise to a capital gain in the hands of the company in terms of 











paragraph 12(5) of the Eighth Schedule either because the loan waived is greater than the 
assessed loss or the debt was not incurred in the ordinary course of trade. In this case study 
however the debtor and the creditor here are part of the same group of companies and therefore 
paragraph 12(5) cannot apply (paragraph 12(5)(bb)). 
The relevant case of CIR v Datakor Engineering (Proprietary) Limited 60 SATC 503 dealt with 
similar facts where amounts owing by the taxpayer were converted into cumulative redeemable 
preference shares. The question asked by the court was whether the taxpayer derived a benefit 
pursuant to the implementation of a scheme of arrangement in terms of section 311 of the 
Companies ACt.215 The court said; 
"The court in answering the question whether any benefit had been received by or 
had accrued to respondent, it was correct that any arrangement or dispensation by 
which a company is protected from action by its creditors so as to enable it to 
continue with its business, whether by means of a subordination agreement or the 
capitalisation of the claims, must redound to its benefit, the company is discharged 
from liquidation and its creditors are replaced by a shareholder, who, as the holder 
of redeemable preference shares, cannot sue the company for repayment of the 
capital when redemption becomes due. 216 
That the provision in question concerns itself with 'any benefit', words of a wide and 
indeterminate meaning; the benefit, in the words of the Income Tax Act, is to be 
found in the reduction or extinction of the debt, something which and the extent of 
which was common cause; indeed, the concession by the creditors (to waive the 
balance of their exigible claims against the taxpayer in return for a nebulous 'right' 
of redemption of redeemable preference shares) must of necessity translate into a 
benefit to the taxpayer. ,,217 
The court further held that the taxpayer received a benefit equal to the amount of share 
premium that was created, and that the burden of proof is not on the Commissioner to show 
that an ascertainable money value existed.218. 
Section 20 is not concerned with the benefit, if any received by a creditor, but whether or not a 
benefit is received by the taxpayer (the debtor).219 The court held that the replacement of a 
creditors claim with preference shares amounts to a concession, as an enforceable compulsion 
215 CIR v Datakor Engineering (Proprietary) Limited 60 SATC 503 
216 Supra 503 
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is replaced with something of a completely different nature.220 The court raised the point that 
whether or not preference shares are issued or whether existing claims are subordinated, such 
an arrangement will be for the benefit of the taxpayer.221 
The Datakor case has been criticized as to whether or not a conversion of a loan account into 
shares will more often than not result in it being seen as a concession granted or a compromise 
made with at least one creditor (being a holding company).222 A number of foreign companies 
that converted their foreign loans to their South African subsidiaries into capital have found 
that the subsidiaries assessed losses have been reduced by SARS relying on this principle. 223 
This is consistent with the approach that if a company issues shares, the interests of existing 
shareholders are diluted.224 Should a claim thus be converted into a share, there would clearly 
be at least a benefit arising from a concession made by the holding company.225 
The issue is whether the conversion of the loan to shares amounts to a benefit received by 
Chancer. 
Section (20(1)(a)(ii) provides that the taxpayer's assessed loss will be reduced by the value of 
the amount that reduced or extinguished the taxpayer's liability as a consequence of a 
compromise or concession with any creditors. 
The court in the Datakor case concluded that an arrangement between a debtor and creditor to 
convert the loan into cumulative redeemable preference shares will amount to a benefit to the 
taxpayer.226Respectfully with reference to the Datakor case, conversion of the debt to shares 
will not always amount to a benefit. A benefit for the purposes of section 20(1)( a)(ii), is when a 
debtor pays less than the amount owed. One cannot be certain that the value of the shares is less 
than the debt owed until the shares have been valued. The valuation of the shares will supply 
the true value of the shares and then the value of the shares is compared with the debt owed to 
220 Supra JJ-4 
221 CIR v Datakor Engineering (Proprietary) Limited 60 SATC 503 
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ascertain whether or not a benefit has been received by the taxpayer. Judge Wunch in ITC 1613 
could not quantify the value of the debt in monetary terms.227 I agree with him that, 
" the value of the benefit is not the whole face or amount of the previously existing 
claims, having regard to the nature of the redeemable preference share capital and 
other factors which require examination." In my opinion, without a prescribed 
formula or a deeming provision in the Income Tax Act, it is not possible to ascribe a 
monetary value to the benefit. ,,228 
The SARS Practice manual provides that; 
"The valuation of the shares may in individual cases present some difficulty but 
generally the value will be the middle market price on the date of the agreement. If 
the shares are not quoted on the stock exchange, the valuation will be ascertained on 
the best information available, such as actual sales on or near the date of accrual or, 
if no sales have taken place, by reference to the present or potential value as 
reflected in the company's balance sheet. In some cases it may be necessary for lack 
of information to value the shares at nominal value and leave it to the taxpayer, if the 
valuation is not acceptable to him, to lodge objection and appeal or show cause why 
nominal value is not the true value at date of allotment. ,,229 
My view is, the Court should have first determined the value of the shares prior to answering 
the question of "receiving a benefit "in section 20(1)(a)(ii). Despite my view, the Datakor 
decision dictates that the value of the shares is not important. What matters is that the debtor 
received a benefit as a result of the conversion of the shares and such benefit must be deducted 
from the debtors assessed loss. 
The Dutch case law is of the view that a conversion of a loan to shares is not enough reason to 
recognize taxable profits in relation to the debt for either the debtor or the lender (refer to 
discussion in Chapter 1 para 1.3.5) 
227 ITC 1613 59 SATC 187 at 196 
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In conclusion, the R 4 000 000 loan converted to shares should be set off against the existing 
assessed loss. 
4.1.3 Case study 3 
Question - In terms of the agreement with NDC an amount of R 5 000 000 of the loan is 
automatically released because the South African economy has officially been in recession for 
more than a year. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, when dealing with debt waivers you first have to consider various 
sections of the Act that are applicable in a sequence i.e first consider section 20(1)(a)(ii) 
,section 8(4)(m) and if there is excess available consider paragraph 12(5) of the Eighth 
Schedule. 
4.1.3.1 Section 20(1)(a)(ii) 
Section 20(1)(a)(ii) provides the reduction of the assessed loss of a person who benefits from a 
compromise made with or concession granted by creditors. 
In answering the question, I will make use of Silke's formula breaking down the section into 
the six elements discussed in Chapter 1230; 
)0> The must be a benefit. 
)0> The benefit must have value or be an amount. 
)0> The benefit must be received by the person concerned or accruing to the debtor. 
)0> The concession must result from a concession granted or a compromise made with 
creditors. 
)0> The concession or compromise must result in the taxpayer's liabilities to the creditor being 
reduced or extinguished. 
)0> The liabilities so reduced or extinguished must have arisen in the ordinary course of trade. 











Chancer has received a benefit. Getting a 5 million write off of a loan owing is definitely a 
benefit. In the case of Datakor it was held that an arrangement between a debtor and creditor to 
convert the loan into cumulative redeemable preference shares will amount to a benefit for the 
taxpayer.231 However, it is worth noting that if a creditor merely writes off the debt as bad or 
decides not to enforce the debt it does not necessarily amount to a concession or a 
compromise.232 
Further section (20(1)(a)(ii) provides that the assessed loss will be reduced by the amount or 
value of any benefit received by the taxpayer. As a result of an agreement between Chancer and 
NDC, NDC agreed to reduce Chancer's loan by an amount of R 5 000 000 which is the benefit 
received by Chancer. 
The agreement between Chancer and NDC constitutes a concession because a conceSSIOn 
occurs when a creditor waives its rights to claim for a consideration that is of a lesser value and 
in this case the full amount was waived233 . In essence Chancer's assessed loss of R 4 000 000 
will be wiped out by R 4 000 000 ofthe R 5 000 000 loan waiver. 
In CIR v Louis Zinn Organisation (Pty) Ltd 1958 A it was held that the value of the 
compromise benefit received in one year must reduce any balance of assessed loss incurred at 
the end of the current year that is carried forward to the year in which the compromise benefit 
is enjoyed.234 
The assessed loss was R 4 million and is reduced to nil. There is now an excess of R 1 million 
to deal with under section 8(4)(m) and paragraph 12(5) of the Eighth Schedule. 
4.1.3.2 Section 8 (4)(m) 
In my view, section 8(4 )(m) is subject to section 20 and where section 20 finds application, 
section 8(4)(m) will not apply. Since some authors disagree with the latter view and the fact 
that it is SARS practice to apply all the relevant sections, I will discuss section 8(4)(m) and 
paragraph 12(5). 
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Essentially, since there is a rerpainder of R 1 000 000 from the amount waived by NDC, it is 
necessary to test the applicability of section 8( 4)(m) to the facts at hand. 
Section 8(4)(m) will only find application if; 
A debtor was released or partially released from its obligation to pay any expenditure as a 
result of a cancellation, termination or a waiver; 
At the time of the relief; the expenditure was not paid and 
The expenditure or allowance in relation to such expenditure was allowed as a deduction 
in the current or previous year 
NDC agreed to reduce Chancer's debt by R 5 000 000. Chancer currently owes NDC an 
amount of R 5 000 000, of which R 3 000 000 was used to finance the building and income tax 
allowances amounting to R 450 000 have been claimed on the building. 
The mam purpose of introducing section 8(4)(m) was to widen the scope of a general 
recoupment in section 8(4)(a) in circumstances where there was previously a deduction claimed 
by the taxpayer. Chancer obtained a loan and used part of the loan to purchase the building. 
Furthermore, Chancer claimed allowances amounting to R 450 000. As provided by section 
8(4)(m), Chancer owed NDC a sum of R 5 000 000, obtained allowances for R 450 000 and 
was relieved from its obligation to repay the R 5 000 000 loan. Therefore, the facts at hand fall 
into the ambit of section 8(4 )(m) and the R 450 000 allowances are recouped by Chancer. 
The R 450 000 recoupment is deducted from the R 1 million and there is a balance of R 550 











4.1.3.3 Paragraph 12.5 of the Eighth Schedule 
The final step is to consider whether the R 550 000 remaining falls into the ambit of paragraph 
12(5) of the Eighth Schedule. 
The full R 5 000 000 has to be initially considered in terms of paragraph 12(5) but will be 
reduced by amounts set off under 8( 4)(m) and section 20 and therefore only the R 550 000 has 
to be debated Paragraph 12(5) applies where a debt owed by a person to a creditor is reduced 
or written off by a creditor. The debtor is as a result of the waiver, deemed to have made a gain 
on the sale of the creditor's claim for the amount waived and the gain has to be included in his 
Income. 
The Eighth Schedule (including paragraph 12(5)) will apply were there is an asset, base cost, 
proceeds and a disposal as discussed in Chapter 2.235 
NDC automatically discharged an amount of R 5 000 000 of the loan owed by Chancer. 
Chancer is deemed to have acquired an asset (which is the NDC claim of R 550 000) at a nil 
cost. Further, the base cost of an asset is expenditure actually incurred in acquiring the asset 
including expenditure which was directly related to the improvement and direct costs in respect 
of its acquisition and disposal and certain holding costs236. Therefore, the base cost of this asset 
is nil because Chancer did not actually incur any expenditure in acquiring the asset. 
Consequently, Chancer is deemed to have disposed of this asset to itself for proceeds equal to 
the remainder of the discharged amount ofR 550 ODD. 
In conclusion, Chancer's assessed loss is reduced to nil, a section 8(4 )(m) recoupment of R450 
000 and a taxable capital gain ofR275 000 (R550 000 x 50%) is included in taxable income. 
235 SARS CGT guide 2007 pg 











4.1.4 Case Study 4 - Voluntary Liquidation 
Question - Chancer decides to go into voluntary liquidation. The creditors can expect to 
receive 60 cents for each Rand. 
4.1.4.1 Section 20(I)(a)(ii) 
Assessed loss is defined as the amount by which the deductions (claimed under section 11 to 
19) exceed the income in respect of which these deductions are admissible?37 As section 11 (x) 
includes all the deductions contained in sections 5 to 37H of the Income Tax Act, there are no 
deductions from income that are left out when an assessed loss is calculated.238 
Defining a benefit is really a difficult task, in my view a R 16 250 000 write off of debtors 
loans definitely seems like a benefit. The Oxford dictionary provides that a benefit is 
" an advantage or profit gained from something, a payment made by the state or an 
insurance scheme to someone entitled to receive it e.g an unemployed 
person ... ...... . ,,239 
Huxham makes a comment that, the fact a creditor did not arise from a tax deductible expense 
is irrelevant. 240He further states that if the creditor arose in the ordinary course of trade, the 
assessed loss is reduced.241 So a loan from the holding company which was used for the day to 
day business activities is a debt which arises in the ordinary course of trade?42 This would also 
apply to the overdraft 
237 Huxmam and Haupt, Notes on South African Income Tax 2009 pg 256 
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A company exists as a separate legal entity at the time of incorporation and is terminated by 
means of the dissolution of the company.243 During its existence, the company may have 
acquired rights and incurred liabilities which have to be dealt with before the company is 
dissolved.244 
Prior to dissolution, a process called the winding up or liquidation of the company occurs were 
the company's assets are realised to pay creditors of the company according to their preference 
and then distributing the residue among shareholders in accordance with their rights?45 
A company can be wound up in two ways namely by order of court or voluntarily. A voluntary 
winding up can be either a member's voluntary winding -up or a creditors winding up (refer to 
Para 1.2.4.2).246 
For the purposes of this case study the focus will be on a members' voluntary liquidation. A 
member's liquidation is a procedure that precedes the dissolution of a company which is able to 
pay its debts.247 It can only take place where the company is liquidated for some reason other 
than insolvency. The creditors will not suffer any loss and do not have a say in the winding -up 
procedure.248 The winding up process is initiated by a special resolution passed by members. 
After it has been passed, it is lodged with the Registrar within 28 days and in terms of section 
356(2) of the Companies Act, lodges a certified copy thereof with the Master.249 
The company must, pnor to the registration of the resolution, provide security to the 
satisfaction of the Master, for the payment of the debts of the company within a period not 
243 Cilliers & Bernade, Corporate Law, 3rd edition, Butterworths 2000 pg 494 
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exceeding twelve months from the commencement of the winding up unless the Master has 
dispensed with security?50 
In answering the question at hand, Chancer will not be able to submit itself to voluntary 
liquidation because it is insolvent as the balance sheet reflects that the liabilities exceed the 
assets. Section 344(f) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 provides that a company may be 
wound up by a court if it is unable to pay its debts. As a result of this provision, Chancer can 
only be wound up by a court. 
In this instance, one will have to wait for the court order and determine if the order resulted to a 
waiver of the creditors debts. If the court order results to a debt waiver, section 20(1)(a)(ii) will 
find application. It is to be noted that an individual taxpayer whose estate is voluntarily or 
compulsory sequestrated cannot from the date of sequestration carry forward any assessed loss 
incurred prior to that date, unless the sequestration order is set aside. 
4.1.4.3 Section 8(4) (m) 
In my view, section 8(4 )(m) should only ind application where the creditors voluntarily 
capitulate their rights to claim full payment of debts. The creditors had no say in the matter as 
Chancer submitted itself to voluntary liquidation. There was no positive act on the part of the 
creditors to show that they surrendered their rights to claim full payment of the debts (as 
discussed in Chapter 2 paragraph 2.3). Therefore, section 8(4)(m) should not find application 
because the relief from the obligation was not as a result of cancellation, termination or 
variation of an agreement or due to the prescription, waiver or release of a claim for 
payment.(Refer to para 1.2.3 discussion of a waiver in Chapter 1) 
4.1.4.4 Paragraph 12(5) 
As said earlier, paragraph 12(5) of the Eighth schedule was introduced to deal specifically with 
cases where a debt owed by a debtor to a creditor has been reduced or discharged by the 
creditor for no consideration, or consideration which is less than the amount by which the face 











value of the debt has been reduced or discharged. The debtor is deemed to have acquired a 
claim equal to the amount of debt that was reduced or discharged for no consideration. 
Furthermore, there is a deemed disposal of the claim for proceeds equal to the reduction or 
discharge.251 If a court order is granted to sequestrate Chancer, paragraph 12(5) will be 
applicable ifthe court order results to discharge or reduction of Chancer's obligation to pay the 
creditors for no consideration or a consideration which is les than the amount owed by Chancer. 
Since this case involves liquidation, the creditors still have to lodge a claim, even though they 
are aware that the debtor may not necessarily be able to discharge their debt. Lodging the claim 
would show that the creditor did not waive or reduce the debt and paragraph 12(5) does not 
find application. 
4.1.5 Case study 5 
Holdco cedes its shareholder's loan and sells its 100% shareholding to a fellow group 
company. 
Paragraph 38 read with paragraph 56 discussed in Chapter 2 are relevant in this case_study 
due to the fact that HoldCo's claim against Chancer is ceded to a fellow group company. 
Section 1252 of the Act provides that a connected person in relation to a company is; 
(v) any other company if at least 20% of the equity share capital of such company is 
held by such other company, and no shareholder holds the majority voting rights of 
such company 
(vA) any other company if such other company is managed or controlled by 
(aa) _ any person who or which is a connected person in relation to such company or 
(bb) any person who or which is a connected person contemplated in item (aa) 
HoldCo and the fellow group company are in terms of section 1 connected persons. HoldCo is 
deemed to have disposed of the shareholders loan for the amount received equal to the market 












value in the cession while the fellow group company is deemed to have acquired that asset at a 
cost equal to the market value. 
Paragraph 56(1) provides that the waiver of the debt (creditor) must disregard a capital loss 
determined in consequence of the disposal of a debt owed to him by his connected person.253 
Paragraph 56(2) (a) through (c) further provides that; 
Despite paragraph 39, subparagraph (1) of paragraph 56 does not apply in respect of any 
capital loss determined in consequence of the disposal by a creditor of a claim owed by a 
debtor in certain circumstances. In application of paragraph 56, it is common cause that 
HoldCo disposed of a claim of the shareholders loan by way of cession to a fellow group 
company. HoldCo must in terms of the section disregard any capital loss determined in 
consequence of that disposal unless one of the criteria outlined in subparagraph (2)(a) through 
(c) of paragraph 56(2) is applicable. 
Firstly, there can be no inclusion of an aggregate capital gain or aggregate capital loss for the 
debtor by virtue of paragraph 12(5) arising from this transaction. Chancer's liabilities remain 
unchanged following the cession. Chancer still has an obligation to pay the shareholders loan 
to a fellow company in the group. I submit that the cession of the shareholder's loan triggered 
a disposal by HoldCo of the loan for proceeds equal to the market value of the claim and there 
is no capital gain or loss. 
The cession agreement merely transfers ownership of the claim from HoldCo to a fellow 
group company. There is no reduction or discharge of debt as contemplated in paragraph 
12(5) of the Eighth Schedule. 
With respect to subparagraph 56(2)(b), there does not appear to be any reason to suggest that 
a fellow group company would include any amount in its gross income with regards to the 
acquisition of the claim. Lastly, subparagraph 56(2)(c) does not find application as there is 











no amount to be included in the gross income of the debtor, namely Chancer, that is as a 
result of the cession between HoldCo and the fellow group company. 
In conclusion, there has been no waiver of a debt and the capital loss that might be suffered 
by the fellow group company (being the new creditor) cannot be disregarded. 
On the other hand, HoldCo may argue that it and the fellow group company were 
immediately before the disposal connected persons and paragraph 56 finds application. 
However, because Holdco sold its shareholding and ceded its shareholders loan at the same 
time, they were no longer connected persons at the time of the disposal of the shareholding. 
Therefore, paragraphs 38 and 56 cannot find application and HoldCo will not be deemed to 















The main purpose of this chapter is to provide a summary of the research paper. It will focus 
on the main issues discussed and take into account conclusions and views that arose in the 
discussions. 
It will discuss the similarities between South Africa and certain of the countries in dealing 
with losses on loans or debt waivers. Further, debates dealing with the relevant sections 
namely, 20(1)(a)(ii) , section 8(4)(m) and paragraph 12(5) of the Eighth Schedule of the 
Income Tax 50 of 1962 will be highlighted. As said in the introduction, the aim of this paper 
was not to reach conclusions per se but to illustrate the complexity of applying specific 
income tax sections and certain other relevant tax provisions to situations where a loss in 
respect of a loan account is incurred. 
5.2 International Tax and South Africa in dealing with losses on loans 
In South Africa ("SA"), one of the reasons provided for the insertion of paragraph 12(5) in 
the Eighth Schedule was to enable symmetry in the tax system. A creditor may only be able to 
claim a capital loss in terms of 56(2)(a) of the Eighth Schedule of the ITA if the provisions of 
paragraph 12(5) of the Eighth Schedule where applied to the debtor. If no capital gain arises 
in the hands of the debtor, paragraph 56(2)(a) would not find application. It seems like most 
of the countries discussed in Chapter 1 also apply some form of consistency in dealing with 
debt waivers. For instance in Belgium, a waiver of a debt results to a taxable profit in the 
hands of a debtor and a decrease in the creditor's assets subject to certain conditions. 
It appears that Belgium law is lenient towards the debtor and does not focus on cornering the 
debtor for trying to evade tax or being involved in a tax avoidance scheme. It takes 












that point in time. However, the debt is not wiped out but postponed by means of a "return to 
better fortune clause" so as to allow the debtor to payoff its liabilities when it is in a position 
to do so. 
Denmark (just like SA) is very careful when dealing with connected or related persons. For 
instance, losses on inter-company claims are non-deductible, while South Africa has 
paragraphs 12(5) and 56 of the Eighth Schedule of the ITA. Paragraph 56 provides that where 
a debt owed by a debtor who is a connected person has been waived, a capital loss suffered as 
a result of the debt must be disregarded. However a creditor may claim a loss if the debtor 
suffered a capital gain as a result of the waiver in terms of paragraph 12(5) of the Eighth 
Schedule. 
5.3 Section 20(1)(a)(ii) 
Section 20 (l )(a)(ii) provides for the reduction of assessed losses f a debtor by the amount or 
value of the benefit received by that debtor as a result of a concession or a compromise 
granted by its creditors. The amount borrowed must have been used by the debtor to fund 
trading activities or an asset that was allowed as a deduction in terms of section 11 of the 
Income Tax Act. 
It was determined that the word "benefit" was not defined and this is challenging due to the 
fact that a benefit for one person might not be a benefit for another. However, courts have 
interpreted a reduction or extinguishing of a debt to amount to a benefit.254 Further, that a 
concession or a compromise resulting to a waiver of the creditor's right to claim payment 
against the debtor in exchange for redeemable preference shares, translates to a benefit. 255 
This places a heavy burden on the debtor to rebut the presumption that waiver of a debt in 
exchange for shares amounts to a benefit in the hands of the debtor. In my view, the fact that 
the creditor has a stake in the company is evidence that the waiver did not amount to a 
benefit. It received shares in the debtors company in exchange for his right to claim. The 
creditor will be receiving dividends declared by the company and may also sell those shares 












at a profit. Therefore, a waiver of the creditor's right does not result to a total loss as the 
shares to the debtor's company might amount to a benefit. 
The scenario was also discussed where one creditor waives a debt as opposed to a group of 
creditors coming together and reaching a mutual decision to waive their debts. Ideally, a 
waiver from a single creditor carries more weight because it comes from a single mind and is 
voluntary. In a case where the debtor has eight creditors and five agree to a compromise but 
the remaining three do not approve the decision, despite the minority disapproval the 
concession will be carried forward. Therefore, even though some of the creditors do not 
voluntary agree to a concession and compromise yet they will still suffer income tax 
consequences arising from this concession or compromise. 
Lastly, Kevin Burt said that a subordination agreement may be regarded as a concession. I 
submit, this is incorrect because in a concession, a creditor gives up his right to claim or 
claims an amount that is less than the debt in dispute. I reiterate, in a novation agreement the 
debt is substituted but the debtor is still liable to pay according to the new obligation. A 
concession has an effect of extinguishing or reducing a debt but in a subordination agreement, 
the company and its creditors agree to terminate old obligations and substitute them with new 
obligations by means of a novation agreement. 
5.4 Section 8(4)(m) 
Section 8( 4)(m) provides that as a result of the cancellation, termination or variation of an 
agreement or due to the prescription, waiver or release of a claim for payment, a debtor is 
partially relieved from an obligation to pay any expenditure actually incurred. Further, the 
expenditure was in the current or previous year of assessment allowed as a deduction. The 
debtor shall be deemed to have recovered or recouped an amount equal to the amount of the 
obligation that was relieved or partially relieved in the year of assessment the obligation was 
so relieved. 
Applying this section to a typical debt Waiver scenano does not seem to produce any 











incurred and claimed as a deduction in tenns of section 11 and the release or partial release of 
a debtor from an obligation to pay the amount used to fund the latter expenditure. 
However, it is worth mentioning that section 8(4)(m) is "subject to" section 20.Further, it 
would make logical sense to refrain from instituting section 8(4)((m) to amounts that have 
already been taken into account to reduce the taxpayers assessed loss in tenns of section 
20(1 )(a)(ii). This is so, because, section 8( 4)(m) is subject to section 20. If section 20 has 
already applied to a set of facts, section 8(4)(m) cannot apply to those set of facts. I find 
support in the case below where the words "subject to" where discussed.256 : 
'The words "subject to" can, depending upon the context in which they are used, 
infer or determine the existence of a condition precedent, or amount to no more than 
the term of an agreement. Where those words appear in a statutory provision 
" ... [gJenerally speaking, the words 'subject to' have the effect of introducing a 
qualification, limitation or condition precedent, thereby curtailing a person's 
exercise of otherwise unrestricted rights. It does not, in this sense, mean an 
alternative or optional right without affecting an unfettered original right. " 
'(Per Goldin J in Hickman v The Attorney-General 1980 (2) SA 583 (R) at 585E-F.) 
'In other statutory provisions, the same words may mean "except as curtailed by" 
'Depending on the context, the same words can prescribe the manner and fashion in 
which certain powers and duties may, or must be exercised . ... 
The words "subject to" could also constitute a condition precedent, meaning that a 
test or action must be completed, that something has to take place before the 
agreement does in fact become binding upon the parties thereto. 
256 By Hancke J in CIR, Transkei, and another v JALC Holdings (SA) (Ply) Ltd and another 1991 (4) SA 
646 (Tk), 54 SATC 7 at 10-11 (on appeal as Moodie v CIR, Transkei, and another; CIR, Transkei, and 
another v Moodie and another 1993 (2) SA 501 (Tk AD) 55 SATC 164). See the authorities cited there; 











With reference to the above authority, "subject to" in this context means that section 20 
precedes section 8(4)(m), therefore if an amount waived was taken into account to reduce the 
debtor's assessed loss, the remaining amount cannot be used to recoup the expenditure in 
terms of section 8(4)(m). 
5.5 Paragraph 12(5) of the Eighth Schedule 
SARS provides the reason why paragraph 12(5) was inserted which was to ensure that a 
debtor relieved by a waiver was subjected to Capital Gains Tax ("CGT") on the capital gain 
equal to the amount discharged or waived.257 Further, SARS wanted to strike an equilibrium 
in the tax system ensuring that there is a matching of capital gains and losses. 258 To gain the 
equilibrium, the debtor relieved from the obligation to pay is liable to pay CGT, and the 
creditor may claim a capital loss suffered as a result of the relief. 
The symmetry objective is seemingly achieved when one applies paragraph 12(5) and 
paragraph 56. Because on the one hand, the debtor is liable for CGT equal to the amount 
waived, while on the other, the creditor is able to a claim capital loss as a result of the waiver. 
However, some authors are of the opinion that the symmetry objective is not fully met where 
a creditor is a non-resident and the debtor is a resident. 259 Paragraph 12(5) will be applied to 
the debtor even though the creditor is not subject to CGT.26oIf the debtor was a non-resident 
and the creditor was the resident, the creditor would not be able to claim the capital loss in 
terms of paragraph 56 if the parties are connected persons.261 In both instances the symmetry 
objective is not achieved. 
The fundamental objective of paragraph 12(5) to ensure that a debtor relieved from his 
obligation to pay his debt is taxable on his gain, is criticised. It is said that this paragraph is an 
anomaly in the Eighth Schedule.262 The main purpose of the Eighth Schedule is to tax a gain 
made by the owner of an asset who disposed of its assets at a gain. 
m Comprehensive guide to Capital Gains Tax, Issue 2, para 6.2.5.1 
258 Supra 














In the context of the Eighth Schedule, the paragraph might only have relevance by creating 
fictions that the following acts are deemed to occur: 
(a) the debtor is treated as having acquired the creditors claim's to so much of his debt as is 
discharged for no consideration and therefore has acquired an asset at nil cost263 . 
(b) the debtor is treated as having disposed of his claim to himself for proceeds equal to the 
discharged amount264. 
The paragraph simply caters for disposals which are not actual disposals, but are treated as 
disposals of assets before being reacquired by the disposer because assets are present in all 
other cases except for paragraph 12(5).265 
In conclusion, taxpayers should refrain from debt waiver situations as losses on loans can 
result to adverse income tax consequences. The underlying reason why losses on loans trigger 
Section 8(4)(m) and section 20(1)(a)(ii) consequences is generally understood. These two 
sections provide a sense of matching between the benefit received and the resulting reduction 
of assessed losses and recoupments. There are circumstances as discussed where these 
sections might not be easily applied and not all debt waiver situations may result in a benefit. 
I agree with Meyerowitz that paragraph 12(5) mainly aims at ensuring that the debtor relieved 
from his obligation to pay debt is taxable on his gain and this objective defeats the purpose of 
the Eighth Schedule266. The Schedule is designed to tax owners of assets who made a gain 
from a disposal of those assets?67 It does not tax the person acquiring the asset until he/she 
has disposed of that asset for a consideration or deemed consideration if he does so to a 
connected person268. In the instance of debt waivers paragraph 12(5) finds application by 
creating an asset that does not exist. In my view, this paragraph should not be included in the 
263 Supra 
26~ Supra 10 
265 Supra 













Eighth Schedule because it does not comply with all the building blocks of capital gains tax 
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